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Authentication-Results header

What is Authentication-Results header?

The Authentication-Results header (RFC 8601) records the SPF, DKIM, and DMARC verdicts a receiving mail server already computed, so downstream systems can read what was verified instead of repeating the checks. AdminKit's guide to SPF, DKIM, and DMARC explains the three checks this header reports the results of.

By AdminKit team, Netbase JSC · Updated

The Authentication-Results header (RFC 8601, also tracked on the IETF Datatracker) is a header a receiving mail server adds to a message recording the verdicts of its own SPF, DKIM, and DMARC checks — pass, fail, softfail, or none — along with identifying details like which domain and selector were checked, as Microsoft’s own anti-spam header documentation describes. Downstream systems, such as a user’s mail client, an anti-spam filter, or a later hop in a multi-server mail setup, can read this header to see what was already verified instead of repeating the same DNS lookups and cryptographic checks. It sits above the Received header lines each hop prepends, which record the path a message took rather than any authentication verdict. Because any sender could forge this header on a message sent directly to a mailbox, receivers are expected to add it only at a trust boundary and strip or overwrite any instance a message already carried, so recipients inside that boundary can rely on it. The open-source Rspamd spam filter’s milter_headers module, for example, adds an Authentication-Results header and by default removes any existing ones the message already carries.

Authentication-Results header is part of AdminKit’s email authentication cluster; the full AdminKit glossary lists other related terms.

Frequently asked questions

What does the Authentication-Results header let downstream systems skip?

It lets a mail client, spam filter, or later server hop read SPF, DKIM and DMARC verdicts a receiving server already computed, instead of repeating the same DNS lookups and cryptographic checks.

Can a sender forge an Authentication-Results header?

Yes -- any sender could forge this header on a message sent directly to a mailbox, which is why receivers are expected to add it only at a trust boundary.

What should a receiver do with an Authentication-Results header a message already carries?

Strip or overwrite it at the trust boundary, so recipients inside that boundary can rely on the header the trusted server itself added.

What verdicts does the header record?

Pass, fail, softfail, or none for SPF, DKIM and DMARC, along with identifying details like which domain and selector were checked.