Certificate Transparency (CT) log
What is Certificate Transparency (CT) log?
A Certificate Transparency (CT) log, defined in RFC 6962, is an append-only, publicly auditable record that every trusted certificate authority must publish each TLS certificate into before browsers treat it as valid. AdminKit's guide to monitoring CT logs explains how to catch a mis-issued certificate for your own domain.
By AdminKit team, Netbase JSC · Updated
Certificate Transparency (CT) is a framework, defined in RFC 6962, that requires publicly trusted certificate authorities to publish every TLS certificate they issue into append-only, cryptographically verifiable logs before browsers will treat the certificate as valid — the certificate.transparency.dev project documents how the log, monitor and auditor roles fit together. A CT log entry is permanent and publicly searchable, which means a certificate issued for a domain — whether requested by its owner or mis-issued through a compromised or coerced validation process — becomes visible to anyone who checks, even well after the fact if nobody was watching at issuance time. CT doesn’t prevent mis-issuance or judge whether an issuance was authorized; it only guarantees a record exists, so the security benefit depends on someone actually reviewing a domain’s logged certificates, for example through a public log search tool like crt.sh, rather than assuming the absence of an alert means nothing happened.
What a CT log does and doesn’t do:
- Does: permanently and publicly record every certificate a trusted CA issues for your domain.
- Does not: stop a mis-issued certificate from being issued in the first place.
- Depends on: someone actually searching the logs — silence isn’t proof nothing happened.
Certificate Transparency (CT) log is part of AdminKit’s machine protocols cluster; the full AdminKit glossary lists other related terms.
Frequently asked questions
What does Certificate Transparency require before a browser trusts a certificate?
That a publicly trusted certificate authority publish the certificate into an append-only, cryptographically verifiable CT log first.
Does CT prevent a certificate from being mis-issued?
No -- CT doesn't prevent mis-issuance or judge whether an issuance was authorized; it only guarantees a permanent, searchable record exists.
How does someone actually catch a mis-issued certificate for their domain?
By reviewing a domain's logged certificates, for example through a public log search tool like crt.sh, rather than assuming the absence of an alert means nothing happened.
What roles make up the CT ecosystem?
Logs, monitors and auditors, each with a distinct role in recording, watching and verifying certificate issuance.