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JWT (JSON Web Token)

What is JWT (JSON Web Token)?

A JWT (JSON Web Token) is a compact, signed string of claims -- who issued it, who it's for, when it expires -- used as an OAuth 2.0 bearer token so a resource server can verify a request's sender without calling the issuer. AdminKit's guide to the MCP confused deputy problem covers why checking a JWT's audience claim matters.

By AdminKit team, Netbase JSC · Updated

A JSON Web Token (JWT), defined in RFC 7519, is a compact, URL-safe format for representing a set of claims — statements like who a token was issued to, who issued it, which audience it’s valid for, and when it expires — the standard claim names for these are registered in IANA’s JSON Web Token Claims registry — as a string of three parts, base64url-encoded and separated by dots — a header, a payload of claims, and a signature — signed per RFC 7515 (or optionally encrypted), the same three-part structure jwt.io’s introduction to JWTs walks through. Because the signature is computed over the header and payload together, any party holding the issuer’s public key (or shared secret, for symmetric algorithms) can verify a JWT wasn’t altered after issuance without needing to call back to the issuer for every check, which is what makes it a popular format for OAuth 2.0 access tokens and ID tokens passed between a client, an authorization server, and a resource server. That public key is usually one of several published in the issuer’s JWKS, looked up by the key ID (kid) named in the JWT’s own header. A JWT’s audience claim is exactly the field an audience-bound token check relies on to catch token passthrough: a server validating that claim can reject a token that was issued for a different recipient, rather than trusting any validly signed token regardless of who it actually names — the same check at the center of the confused deputy problem in MCP servers. A JWT being signed only guarantees its contents weren’t tampered with; unless it’s also encrypted, the claims inside are readable by anyone who obtains the token, which matters for what gets placed in one — OWASP’s JSON Web Token Cheat Sheet makes the same point, noting that signed JWTs are not confidential.

AdminKit groups jWT (JSON Web Token) under its AI agents & MCP cluster — browse the AdminKit glossary index for other related terms.

Frequently asked questions

Does a JWT's signature keep its contents secret?

No -- a JWT being signed only guarantees its contents weren't tampered with. Unless it's also encrypted, the claims inside are readable by anyone who obtains the token, which matters for what gets placed in one.

How does a party verify a JWT without calling back to the issuer?

Any party holding the issuer's public key (or shared secret, for symmetric algorithms) can verify the signature computed over the JWT's header and payload, confirming it wasn't altered after issuance, with no callback to the issuer needed for every check.

Where does a verifier find the public key for a given JWT?

Usually in the issuer's JWKS (JSON Web Key Set), a published set of keys. The JWT's own header names which one to use via its key ID (kid) field.

Why does a JWT's audience claim matter for security?

A server validating the audience claim can reject a token that was issued for a different recipient, rather than trusting any validly signed token regardless of who it actually names -- the exact check at the center of the confused deputy problem in MCP servers, where a passed-through token could otherwise be replayed against the wrong resource server.