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NSEC3 record

What is NSEC3 record?

NSEC3, defined in RFC 5155, is a DNSSEC record that proves a DNS name doesn't exist using a salted hash of the zone's real owner names, closing the zone-enumeration gap the original NSEC record left open. AdminKit's DNSSEC guide covers where this authenticated denial fits in the signature chain.

By AdminKit team, Netbase JSC · Updated

NSEC3 is a DNSSEC record type, defined in RFC 5155 (a Proposed Standard per its IETF Datatracker entry), that lets a resolver cryptographically confirm a queried name genuinely doesn’t exist in a signed zone — authenticated denial of existence, the same mechanism RFC 4035 defines for DNSSEC generally — without the zone publishing every name it contains in a walkable, plaintext order. The original NSEC record proves non-existence the same way, but does so using the zone’s real owner names arranged sequentially, which lets anyone walk the chain and enumerate every name in the zone, even ones never otherwise published. NSEC3 replaces those owner names with a salted cryptographic hash of each one, so proving a gap between two hashed values no longer reveals the names that would fall inside it — though Cloudflare’s own writeup on DNSSEC complexities is candid that this hashing only slightly improves zone privacy, since a guessable or short subdomain name can still be recovered from its hash. It also supports an Opt-Out flag, letting a zone with many unsigned delegated subdomains skip signing each one without weakening validation for the names that are signed. Microsoft’s DNSSEC overview for Windows Server describes NSEC3 as “a replacement or alternative to NSEC that prevents zone walking” and notes that a zone can be signed with either NSEC or NSEC3, but not both. The zone-walking weakness it closes is specific to the original NSEC record’s design, not DNSSEC’s signature chain generally — a resolver validating RRSIG/DNSKEY signatures gets the same denial-of-existence guarantee either way, just without the enumeration side effect.

AdminKit groups nSEC3 record under its DNS cluster — browse the AdminKit glossary index for other related terms.

Frequently asked questions

How does NSEC3 fix NSEC's zone-walking weakness?

By replacing each zone owner name with a salted cryptographic hash, so proving a gap between two hashed values no longer reveals the names that fall inside it.

Does NSEC3 provide a different validation guarantee than NSEC?

No -- a resolver validating RRSIG/DNSKEY signatures gets the same authenticated denial-of-existence guarantee either way, just without the enumeration side effect.

What does NSEC3's Opt-Out flag do?

It lets a zone with many unsigned delegated subdomains skip signing each one, without weakening validation for the names that are signed.

What RFC defines NSEC3?

RFC 5155.