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Open DNS resolver

What is Open DNS resolver?

An open DNS resolver answers recursive queries from any client on the internet rather than only its intended users, letting an attacker spoof a victim's address and trigger a flood of replies far larger than the request -- a DNS amplification attack. AdminKit's resolver test walks you through finding the resolver actually answering a device's queries.

By AdminKit team, Netbase JSC · Updated

An open DNS resolver accepts and answers recursive queries from any client on the internet, not just the network or users it was meant to serve. Because a small DNS query can produce a much larger response, an attacker can send a query to an open resolver with a victim’s IP address spoofed as the source, so the oversized reply floods the victim instead of the attacker — a reflection and amplification attack. CISA’s alert on DNS amplification attacks describes this identical technique: “an attacker sends a DNS name lookup request to an open DNS server with the source address spoofed to be the target’s address.” RFC 5358 — also tracked on its IETF Datatracker page — published as BCP 140, recommends operators restrict recursive DNS service to intended clients only, through access control lists or authentication, rather than leaving it open to the whole internet. Some resolver software ships with that restriction as its default: the Unbound resolver’s configuration reference states that by default only localhost is implicitly allowed to query it and the rest is refused, with access-control statements used to admit other networks. The attack also depends on source-address spoofing working at all, which is the separate problem BCP 38 addresses by filtering forged source addresses at the network edge; closing either gap — open recursion or spoofable source addresses — helps prevent this class of attack.

Open DNS resolver is part of AdminKit’s DNS cluster; the full AdminKit glossary lists other related terms.

Frequently asked questions

Why does a DNS amplification attack need a spoofed source address?

An attacker sends a query to an open resolver with a victim's IP spoofed as the source, so the much larger reply floods the victim instead of the attacker who sent the request.

What does RFC 5358 (BCP 140) recommend for recursive DNS service?

That operators restrict recursive DNS service to intended clients only, through access control lists or authentication, rather than leaving a resolver open to the whole internet.

Is fixing open resolvers the only way to stop DNS amplification attacks?

No -- the attack also depends on source-address spoofing working, which BCP 38 addresses separately by filtering forged source addresses at the network edge; closing either gap helps.

Can AdminKit tell me which resolver is actually answering my queries?

Yes -- AdminKit's resolver test names the resolver actually answering a device's queries, the same trust boundary an open resolver gives away to anyone.