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Why email forwarding breaks SPF, and how SRS and ARC fix it

AdminKit's SPF check can flag forwarded mail as a failure even though nothing is broken: SPF authorizes sending IPs against a published list, and a forwarding server resends a message without rewriting the original sender address, so it's never on that domain's SPF list. SRS rewrites the envelope sender to fix it; ARC preserves the original authentication results instead.

By AdminKit team, Netbase JSC · Updated

Key takeaways

  • SPF checks the IP address of the server handing over a message against the domain in the envelope sender (MAIL FROM). A forwarder keeps that domain but connects from its own IP, so genuine forwarded mail fails SPF.
  • SRS rewrites the envelope sender into the forwarder’s own domain. SPF then passes, but for the forwarder’s domain, so it no longer lines up with the From domain that DMARC checks.
  • That leaves DKIM as the check that carries DMARC through a forward. It survives as long as the forwarder doesn’t change the signed headers or body.
  • ARC (RFC 8617, an Experimental RFC) lets each forwarder seal the results it saw. A receiver may use a trusted sealer’s results to override a DMARC failure, but nothing obliges it to.
  • Forwarded-mail failures are fixed by the forwarder and the receiver. The sender’s part is to sign every mail stream with a DKIM key aligned with its From domain.

Why do forwarding and SPF clash?

This forwarding-specific SPF failure is one of the more nuanced topics in AdminKit’s email authentication cluster, which otherwise covers getting SPF, DKIM and DMARC published correctly in the first place. SPF, as defined in RFC 7208 (canonical record on the IETF Datatracker), works by publishing a list of IP addresses or hostnames authorized to send mail claiming to be from a domain, and having receiving mail servers check the IP of the server currently delivering the message against that list. This check is deliberately about the connecting server, not the message’s original author — SPF has no concept of “this message originated somewhere else and is only passing through.”

Forwarding breaks that model directly. When a mailbox forwards a message — whether through an explicit “forward to” rule, a mailing list, or an automatic redirect — the forwarding server delivers the message to the next recipient without becoming the original sender. The envelope sender (the technical MAIL FROM address checked by SPF, which is often invisible in a mail client and different from the visible “From:” header; see envelope sender vs header From) still shows the original sender’s domain, but the connecting IP is now the forwarding server’s, which was never authorized by the original domain’s SPF record. The result is a legitimate, non-spoofed message that still technically fails SPF — SPF working exactly as specified, just not in the way an end user expects. See our guide on SPF, DKIM, and DMARC explained for how SPF fits into the broader authentication picture.

The table below follows one message from alice@example.com through the paths RFC 7960 §2.2 describes. The forwarder’s domain is forwarder.example.net.

Delivery pathConnecting serverDomain SPF checksSPF resultAligned with From for DMARC?
Direct from Alice’s providerListed in example.com’s SPFexample.compassYes
Forwarded, envelope sender keptThe forwarderexample.comfailNo (SPF failed)
Forwarded with SRSThe forwarderforwarder.example.netpassNo (different domain)
Bounce relayed by the forwarder (empty MAIL FROM)The forwarderThe forwarder’s HELO domainmay passNo

RFC 7960 sums up both forwarding cases in one line: “SPF cannot yield relevant Authenticated Identifiers, and DKIM must be relied upon to produce results that are relevant to DMARC.”

Which kinds of forwarding cause this?

RFC 7960 groups the systems that resend mail on someone’s behalf as “mediators”, and they don’t all break the same things:

  • Aliases and forward rules. A .forward file, a Sieve redirect, or a mailbox setting that forwards to another provider. The content usually arrives unchanged, so DKIM tends to survive, but the delivery path leaves the sender’s SPF record behind.
  • Mailing lists. A list reposts each message to its members and often adds a subject tag or footer. That breaks SPF and usually DKIM.
  • Message-scanning services. RFC 8617 §7.1.1 describes filtering services that sit in front of a domain’s own mail servers: rerouting “almost always breaks” SPF, and rewritten links or added footers “almost always break” DKIM.
  • Resending from a mail client. Forwarding a message “inline” or resending it to a new recipient keeps the original author in view without any aligned identifier. RFC 7960 notes this does not apply to forwarding a message as an attachment.

How does SRS rewrite the envelope sender?

SRS solves this at the point where the problem is introduced: the forwarding server itself. Instead of relaying the message with the original envelope sender untouched, an SRS-capable forwarder rewrites it to an address on the forwarder’s own domain before relaying it onward. That rewritten address encodes enough information to route any bounce back to the original sender, but critically, it belongs to the forwarder’s domain. When the final recipient’s server checks SPF, it’s now checking the forwarder’s IP against the forwarder’s own SPF record, which correctly lists that IP, so the check passes.

The PostSRSd project, an SRS daemon for Postfix, documents the address shape: a cryptographic signature and a timestamp go in front of the original domain and local part, so a bounce can be verified and sent back, and forged or expired addresses can be thrown away. The values below are made up for illustration:

# Illustrative envelope sender, before and after an SRS forwarder
Original:    MAIL FROM:<alice@example.com>
After SRS:   MAIL FROM:<SRS0=HHHH=TT=example.com=alice@forwarder.example.net>
#                        HHHH = signature, TT = timestamp

SRS is a widely deployed convention rather than a formal IETF standard. RFC 7208 Appendix D.2 lists rewriting the MAIL FROM into the forwarder’s own domain as one way forwarders can avoid SPF failures, and notes that the forwarder then has to pass any bounce back to the original sender itself. Its biggest limitation is that it only works if the forwarding server itself implements it — a domain owner on the receiving end of forwarded mail can’t force a third-party forwarder to adopt SRS. It also only addresses SPF; it does nothing for DKIM.

There is a second limit that is easy to miss. After SRS, SPF passes for forwarder.example.net, not for example.com. DMARC only counts an SPF pass when its domain matches the From domain, so an SRS pass does nothing for DMARC. Whether the forwarded message passes DMARC now depends entirely on DKIM. The relaxed vs strict alignment guide explains how that domain match works.

How does ARC preserve the original results?

ARC, defined in RFC 8617 and published as an Experimental RFC, takes a structurally different approach. Rather than rewriting anything to make a later check pass, each server in a forwarding chain adds a cryptographically signed “ARC set” to the message, recording what the authentication results (SPF, DKIM, DMARC) looked like at that hop, along with who forwarded it. A final recipient can then see that a message genuinely passed SPF and DKIM before a known, trusted forwarder relayed it — and the receiving mail system can choose to honor that historical result instead of penalizing the message for failing SPF on the final hop. This also helps with DKIM, which SRS doesn’t touch: a forwarder that modifies a message (adding a disclaimer footer, converting line endings) can break the original DKIM signature, and ARC preserves a record that it was valid before that happened.

Each ARC set is three header fields that share an instance number, i=1 for the first forwarder, i=2 for the next, and so on up to 50:

Header fieldWhat it carries
ARC-Authentication-Results (AAR)The SPF, DKIM and DMARC results this hop saw on arrival, in the same format as Authentication-Results
ARC-Message-Signature (AMS)A DKIM-style signature over the message as this hop sends it on
ARC-Seal (AS)A signature over all ARC sets so far, plus cv= (chain validation: none, pass or fail)

ARC depends on both sides supporting it — the forwarder must sign an ARC set, and the final recipient’s mail system must be willing to evaluate ARC results rather than just the raw SPF/DKIM/DMARC outcome. RFC 8617 §7.2.1 leaves the last step to the receiver: a DMARC processor “MAY choose to accept” the results in a valid chain “as a matter of local policy”. Microsoft 365, for example, lets administrators add trusted ARC sealers. Once a sealer is trusted, Microsoft 365 uses the original authentication results that sealer recorded when it validates messages sent through that service. Microsoft advises adding only legitimate services that are actually needed.

When a receiver does lean on ARC, it can say so in your DMARC aggregate reports. This fragment is the example from RFC 8617 §7.2.2: SPF and DKIM both failed on arrival, yet the disposition is none because the chain validated.

<policy_evaluated>
  <disposition>none</disposition>
  <dkim>fail</dkim>
  <spf>fail</spf>
  <reason>
   <type>local_policy</type>
   <comment>arc=pass as[2].d=d2.example as[2].s=s2
     as[1].d=d1.example as[1].s=s3
     remote-ip[1]=2001:DB8::1A</comment>
  </reason>
</policy_evaluated>

SRS or ARC: which one fixes what?

The two are not alternatives so much as answers to different parts of the problem. A forwarder can run both.

QuestionSRSARC
Who has to support it?Only the forwarderThe forwarder (to seal) and the final receiver (to trust the seal)
What changes on the message?The envelope sender is rewrittenNew header fields are added; nothing is rewritten
SPF on the final hopPasses, for the forwarder’s domainStill fails; the earlier pass is on record
DKIM broken by the forwarderNo helpThe earlier DKIM pass is on record
Effect on DMARCNone; DMARC rests on DKIMThe receiver may override a failure as local policy
StatusConvention, not an RFCRFC 8617, Experimental

What can each party do about it?

Who can fix what depends on where you sit in the chain.

If you send the mail. Sign every stream with DKIM using a key for your own From domain. Google’s forwarding best practices say that forwarded messages “often fail SPF authentication” and that DKIM is “especially important” for them. Don’t try to add forwarders’ addresses to your SPF record: you can’t list every forwarder your recipients use, and RFC 7208 Appendix D.3 puts that trust decision with the receiving side. Before moving DMARC to p=reject, look for forwarded rows in your aggregate reports. Under that policy, mail from a forwarder that breaks DKIM can be rejected unless the receiver overrides the failure.

If you run the forwarder. Turn on SRS, avoid changing messages you pass on (RFC 7960 §4.1.3.2 suggests adding header fields rather than editing the body or existing headers), and seal with ARC if your mail software supports it. RFC 7208 Appendix D.2 also lists a blunter option: refuse mail that would fail SPF once forwarded, with SMTP reply 551 User not local and the address to resend to.

If you receive the mail. Trust ARC seals only from services you actually route mail through, such as your own filtering service or a mailing list host your staff use.

How do you tell forwarding from spoofing?

A forwarded-mail SPF failure looks identical, from the SPF record’s perspective, to a spoofed message — both show a connecting IP that isn’t on the domain’s SPF list. The distinguishing signal is usually in the receiving server’s authentication report: a legitimate forwarder typically has a consistent, identifiable IP or hostname, often a known mailbox provider’s infrastructure, rather than an arbitrary unrelated server. Use AdminKit’s SPF check tool to confirm exactly what your domain’s SPF record currently authorizes, and our DMARC check tool and guide on DMARC aggregate reports to see real delivery and failure patterns before assuming every SPF failure is spoofing — and before tightening a DMARC policy to p=reject prematurely, which can silently drop forwarded mail from legitimate senders whose forwarders don’t yet support SRS or ARC.

Two more AdminKit tools read the evidence without sending it anywhere. The DMARC report analyzer opens an aggregate report in your browser and shows, per source IP, the envelope sender, the SPF and DKIM results, and any receiver override such as the local_policy reason above. The email header analyzer reads one received message’s Authentication-Results header and lists each verdict the receiving server wrote, including an arc= result when there is one.

What you seeWhat it usually meansWhat to do
SPF fails, DKIM passes for your own domainGenuine mail that was forwardedNothing on your side; DMARC passes through DKIM
SPF passes for a domain you don’t own, envelope sender starts with SRS0=Forwarded through an SRS forwarderNothing; check that DKIM still passes
SPF and DKIM both fail, receiver override local_policy with arc=passForwarded; the receiver trusted the ARC chainNote the forwarder; no change needed
SPF and DKIM both fail, an IP or network you’ve never used, no overrideLikely spoofing, or a sender you forgot to set upFind out who sends from that source before enforcing DMARC

SPF forwarding failures are one specific, well-understood cause of SPF breakage — if you’re instead seeing a PermError about too many DNS lookups, that’s a different and more common SPF problem covered in fixing SPF “too many DNS lookups”. A different envelope-sender quirk entirely is backscatter, where a spammer forges your domain as the MAIL FROM address on someone else’s spam run rather than your own mail being forwarded — see email bounces and backscatter explained.

This guide is general information, not a security audit of your specific network — see our disclaimer for what AdminKit's guidance does and does not commit to.

Frequently asked questions

Why does SPF break specifically for forwarded mail, not normal mail?

SPF validates the server that's currently connecting and delivering the message, identified by the SMTP envelope sender (the 'MAIL FROM' address), against the domain that address belongs to. Normal mail is sent directly from a server the sender's domain has authorized. Forwarded mail is relayed by a third server — a mailbox provider's forwarding service, a mailing list, or a company's own forward rule — that was never added to the original domain's SPF record, because the domain owner has no relationship with that forwarding service at all.

What is SRS and how does it fix this?

Sender Rewriting Scheme (SRS) rewrites the envelope sender address at the forwarding server, replacing it with an address on the forwarder's own domain that encodes the original sender for bounce-handling purposes. Because the rewritten envelope sender belongs to the forwarder's domain, SPF now checks the forwarding server's IP against the forwarder's own SPF record, which lists it, so SPF passes. SRS is a convention, not an IETF RFC: RFC 7208 Appendix D.2 describes rewriting the MAIL FROM into the forwarder's domain as one option for forwarders, and SRS is a widely used way to do it. The SPF pass is for the forwarder's domain, so it does not align with the visible From domain for DMARC.

What is ARC and how is it different from SRS?

Authenticated Received Chain (ARC), defined in RFC 8617 (an Experimental RFC), takes a different approach: instead of rewriting anything, each forwarding hop adds a signed, tamper-evident record of what the authentication results (SPF, DKIM, DMARC) looked like when the message reached that hop. The final recipient's mail server can then see that the message passed SPF and DKIM before it went through this forwarder, and decide whether to trust that based on the forwarder's own reputation, even though the message now fails SPF on arrival. Unlike SRS, ARC also covers DKIM signatures broken by forwarders that modify messages.

Does SRS or ARC fix DKIM too?

Not SRS — SRS only rewrites the envelope sender for SPF purposes and does nothing for DKIM. DKIM is generally more forwarding-resilient than SPF because it signs the message content rather than checking the connecting server's IP, but a forwarder that modifies the message (adding a footer, converting encoding, or rewriting headers) can still break the DKIM signature. ARC is the mechanism built specifically to preserve authentication context through forwarding for both SPF and DKIM results.

If my domain's mail keeps failing SPF after being forwarded, what should I actually do?

First confirm it's genuinely a forwarding scenario and not a real spoofing attempt — check whether the failing rows in your DMARC aggregate reports come from a forwarding service you recognize, and whether DKIM still passes for your domain on them. If so, the fix is on the forwarding side, not the originating domain's SPF record: ask whether the forwarder implements SRS or seals messages with ARC, since your domain's own SPF record can't be modified to 'allow' arbitrary third-party forwarders without defeating the purpose of SPF. On your side, make sure every message carries a DKIM signature aligned with your From domain. If you control the forwarding service yourself, check whether it has SRS or ARC support available but disabled.

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Huy Nguyen (David), Founder and CEO of Netbase JSC

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Huy Nguyen (David), Founder & CEO, Netbase JSC

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