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How do you file an abuse report once you've found the contact?

AdminKit's WHOIS/RDAP lookup shows which registrar or network holds a domain or IP. Filing the report well is a separate job: what you send, how specific and well-evidenced it is, and whether it goes to the registrar or the network operator all decide whether it gets acted on. ICANN requires registrars to investigate reports of abuse.

By AdminKit team, Netbase JSC · Updated

Key takeaways

  • Send the report to the party that controls the problem: the registrar for the domain name, the IP block’s network operator for the server or traffic, and the CDN when the site sits behind one.
  • An actionable report names the exact URL, IP or message, says what it is doing, gives a UTC timestamp, and attaches evidence that survives the page going offline.
  • For spam, include the full message headers; ARF (RFC 5965) is the standard format providers use between themselves.
  • Use the channel the organization publishes: its RDAP abuse contact, its web form, or abuse@ its domain as a fallback.
  • Registrars must investigate and, since April 2024, act on actionable evidence of DNS Abuse, but no rule sets a reply deadline for ordinary reports.

Where does this guide pick up?

After you have found the contact. Abuse reporting is one of the WHOIS/RDAP-adjacent topics in AdminKit’s DNS cluster. How to find an abuse contact in a WHOIS/RDAP result covers locating the right address — the registrar’s dedicated abuse role for a domain, or the regional internet registry’s listed contact for an IP block. This guide assumes that step is done and covers what to actually put in the report, and what to realistically expect once you send it.

AdminKit does not file reports for you. Its Whois/RDAP tool shows you the registrar of a domain or the holder of an IP block; the abuse mailbox itself is in the same RDAP record, as an entity with the abuse role.

Who should receive the report?

The party that can actually stop the problem. A domain and the server it resolves to are controlled by two different parties, and each can only act on their own piece:

  • Report the domain to its registrar when the problem is the registration itself — a domain registered specifically to impersonate a brand, a name used for phishing, or one whose registration details suggest fraud. A registrar can suspend, lock, or otherwise act on the registration, but has no access to whatever is actually running on the server the domain points to.
  • Report the IP address to its network’s abuse contact when the problem is what’s running on the server or the traffic coming from it — malware distribution, a compromised host sending spam, or an exposed service being actively abused. That contact, found by running AdminKit’s Whois/RDAP tool against the IP address directly, belongs to whoever the address block is allocated to, not to the domain owner.

When both are implicated — a phishing page on a domain registered an hour ago, hosted on a compromised but otherwise legitimate server — sending both reports, to both contacts, covers each party’s actual area of control rather than hoping one report reaches everyone who could act.

SituationSend it toFind the contact viaWhat they can do
Phishing or malware domain, registered for abuseRegistrarDomain RDAP, entity with role abuseSuspend or lock the name
Phishing page on a hacked legitimate siteHosting provider (IP holder)IP RDAP for the address the domain resolves toTake down the page, contact their customer
Site behind a CDN or reverse proxyCDN’s abuse desk, plus registrarIP RDAP returns the CDN’s blockAct on its own service; it knows the origin host
Spam or scanning from an IPNetwork operator of that IPIP RDAP, or the abuse-c in RIPE’s databaseAct on the customer or host
Your own IP listed on a DNSBLNobody to “report”; fix and request delistingThe DNSBL’s own lookup pageDelist under its own policy

A DNSBL is not a complaint desk. It lists addresses based on its own data, so the route there is cleaning up and following its delisting process; see why is my IP blacklisted? for that path.

What should the report include?

Enough for a stranger to confirm the problem without asking you anything. A report an abuse desk can act on quickly needs to answer, without follow-up questions, what happened, where, and when:

  1. The exact artifact — the full URL, not just a domain name, if the issue is a specific page; the IP address and port if it’s network traffic; the exact message if it’s email abuse.
  2. A timestamp in UTC for when you observed it, to avoid ambiguity across time zones between you and whoever reads the report.
  3. What it’s doing, stated plainly — phishing a specific brand, distributing a named malware family, scanning your network, sending unsolicited mail — rather than a general “this is bad” characterization.
  4. Evidence that doesn’t depend on the artifact still being live — a screenshot, a saved copy of the page’s source, or relevant log lines, since phishing pages and compromised content are often taken down or changed within hours of being reported, sometimes by the attacker rather than the host. NIST SP 800-61’s incident-handling guidance applies the same discipline to any abuse investigation: precise, preserved evidence is what turns a report into something actionable, rather than a claim that can’t be independently verified after the fact.
  5. Your own contact information, even if reporting anonymously feels safer — an abuse desk that needs clarification and has no way to ask will often simply close the report rather than guess at missing detail.

ICANN’s 2024 DNS Abuse advisory gives a concrete example of evidence that helps a registrar: a screenshot showing the phishing attempt and what it targets, and the complete URL where the abuse is located. The evidence you need changes with the type of abuse:

Abuse typeMust includeHelpful extras
PhishingComplete URL, screenshot, brand targeted, UTC time seenPage source, the lure email with headers
Malware hostingComplete download URL, UTC timeFile hash (SHA-256), sandbox or scanner result
SpamFull message headers or the whole messageARF report, count of messages received
Scanning, brute force, DDoSSource IP, destination port, UTC time range, log linesPacket counts, your timezone setting stated
Fraudulent registrationDomain, why it impersonates you, trademark detailsCreation date from RDAP, related domains

What does a good report look like?

Short, specific and complete in the first screen. Put the artifact and abuse type in the subject line, the facts in the first lines, and evidence below. The template below is an illustrative example using documentation names and addresses.

To: abuse@example.net
Subject: Phishing at https://login.example.com/verify/ (targets Example Bank)

Domain:      login.example.com
URL:         https://login.example.com/verify/account.php
Resolves to: 192.0.2.44 (checked 2026-11-09 14:32 UTC)
Abuse type:  Phishing; credential form imitating Example Bank sign-in
First seen:  2026-11-09 14:05 UTC, via email lure (headers attached)

Evidence attached:
  1. screenshot-2026-11-09T1410Z.png
  2. page-source-2026-11-09T1410Z.html
  3. lure-message.eml (complete message with headers)

Requested action: suspend the domain / remove the content.
Reporter: Security team, Example Org, soc@example.org

For network abuse, paste the relevant log lines as text rather than a screenshot, so the desk can search its own logs for the same events. State the timezone of your logs even if it is UTC.

Example log excerpt (illustrative, documentation addresses):

2026-11-09T03:12:44Z sshd[2211]: Failed password for root from 203.0.113.77 port 51022 ssh2
2026-11-09T03:12:46Z sshd[2211]: Failed password for root from 203.0.113.77 port 51040 ssh2
2026-11-09T03:12:49Z sshd[2214]: Failed password for admin from 203.0.113.77 port 51068 ssh2

Trim to the lines that show the pattern. Remove anything that exposes your own users or credentials before you send.

How do you report email abuse?

With the full headers, because the body alone does not show where a message came from. The Received chain, Authentication-Results and Message-ID are what let a mail provider find the message in its own logs. AdminKit’s email header analyzer helps you read that chain and pick out the sending IP before you look up its network.

Providers that exchange complaints in bulk use the Abuse Reporting Format from RFC 5965. An ARF report is a multipart/report message with three parts: a human-readable description, a machine-readable message/feedback-report section, and the original message or its complete header block. Each report covers a single message. You don’t need ARF to send one complaint by hand, but its structure is a good checklist: explain, summarize, attach the original.

Skeleton of an ARF report (illustrative, documentation addresses):

Content-Type: multipart/report; report-type=feedback-report; boundary="b1"

--b1
Content-Type: text/plain

This is an abuse report for a message received from 198.51.100.23.

--b1
Content-Type: message/feedback-report

Feedback-Type: abuse
User-Agent: ExampleMail/1.0
Version: 1
Source-IP: 198.51.100.23
Arrival-Date: Mon, 09 Nov 2026 14:05:12 +0000

--b1
Content-Type: message/rfc822

[original message with all headers]
--b1--

How do you send it?

Through the channel the organization publishes. Most registrar and network abuse contacts expect a plain-text email to the published address rather than a structured form, though some larger registrars and hosting providers also run a dedicated web form — use whichever the organization’s own published abuse policy specifies if one exists, since an email sent somewhere other than the designated channel can sit unread far longer than one sent correctly the first time. ICANN’s RAA requires every accredited registrar to publish both the contact address and a description of its own abuse-handling process on its website — worth a quick check before sending, in case the registrar asks for a specific format or subject line. ICANN’s 2024 advisory adds that a registrar’s abuse web form must not require a login.

For IP space, the regional registries publish the contact. RIPE-705 makes an abuse-c contact, pointing at a role object with an abuse-mailbox, mandatory for every AS number and every directly allocated address block in the RIPE database, and says the RIPE NCC validates those mailboxes at least annually. ARIN’s RDAP service returns points of contact with roles such as abuse and noc. Other regions follow their own policies.

If no dedicated contact appears, RFC 2142 lists abuse@ as the conventional mailbox for reports of inappropriate public behaviour, at the organization’s main domain. It is a reasonable fallback, not a guarantee. Don’t send to the registrant directly: for gTLDs their details are usually redacted, and ICANN’s Registration Data Policy has registrars offer a relay email or web form instead. A relay reaches the person who may be running the abuse.

What should you expect afterward?

An acknowledgment, possibly, and action on the provider’s own schedule. ICANN’s rules require registrars to take “reasonable and prompt steps” to investigate general abuse reports, which is a real obligation but not a fixed deadline — the 24-hour review requirement in the RAA applies specifically to reports of illegal activity submitted through a registrar’s dedicated law-enforcement channel, not to every report from the general public. A 2024 amendment, effective 5 April 2024, strengthened this specifically for DNS Abuse: once a registrar has actionable evidence that a domain it sponsors is used for malware, botnets, phishing, pharming, or spam that delivers one of those, it must promptly take appropriate mitigation action, which gives a well-evidenced report more weight than it had before. In practice, a report with a precise artifact, timestamp, and preserved evidence is simply more likely to be actioned promptly than one without — not because of a formal rule, but because it gives an abuse desk less work to do before deciding to act.

The same advisory requires registrars to confirm receipt of an abuse report, with enough detail (at least the registrar, the reported domain and the submission date) for you to show you filed it. Keep that confirmation. If an accredited registrar does not meet these obligations, ICANN’s registrar abuse page points to a complaint form at ICANN Contractual Compliance. Hosting providers and networks are bound by their own terms and their registry’s policies, not by the RAA.

Which mistakes get reports ignored?

Mostly reports that make the desk do the investigation for you.

MistakeWhy it failsDo this instead
Domain name only, no URLThe desk can’t find the contentSend the complete URL
Local time without a timezoneLogs can’t be matchedUse UTC and say so
Spam forwarded without headersThe source can’t be tracedAttach the original message or its full headers
Same report to every contact at onceWrong desks close it as out of scopeSend each party the part it controls
Screenshot of logs instead of textCan’t be searched or copiedPaste the log lines
Emailing the registrantWarns the abuser, often a relayUse the registrar or network abuse contact

What should you do next?

Run AdminKit’s Whois/RDAP tool against the domain or IP address in question to confirm you have the current, correct abuse contact before sending a report — registrar and hosting assignments can change, and a report sent to a stale contact from an old lookup may never reach anyone who can act on it. If the abuse is coming from an address in your own logs, using reverse DNS to investigate an unfamiliar IP helps you identify the network before you write to it.

This guide is general information, not a security audit of your specific network — see our disclaimer for what AdminKit's guidance does and does not commit to.

Frequently asked questions

I already found the abuse contact — what's left to get right?

The contact just routes your message to the right desk; what happens after that depends entirely on whether the report itself gives that desk enough to act on. A one-line "this domain is doing something bad" message, with no timestamp, no evidence, and no specific URL or IP, is easy to deprioritize or ignore even when it reaches exactly the right inbox. See finding an abuse contact in a WHOIS/RDAP result for the lookup step this guide picks up after.

Am I reporting to the registrar or the hosting provider — does it matter which?

Yes, because they can fix different things. A domain's registrar controls the registration itself — it can suspend or lock a domain name, but it has no access to whatever content or traffic is actually running on a server. The IP address a domain resolves to is controlled separately, by whoever a regional internet registry shows as holding that address block (often a hosting or cloud provider), and that operator can act on the server or network traffic itself. Reporting a phishing domain to its registrar and a compromised web server hosting the phishing page to its hosting provider's abuse contact are two different, complementary reports, not the same one sent twice.

What makes a report 'well-formed' enough that a registrar is obligated to act on it?

ICANN's 2013 Registrar Accreditation Agreement requires accredited registrars to take reasonable and prompt steps to investigate and respond to reports of abuse, but a vague or unsubstantiated claim gives an abuse desk little to investigate. A report that names the specific domain or URL, states what it's doing (phishing, malware distribution, fraudulent registration), and includes a timestamp and supporting evidence is far more likely to meet the bar an abuse desk needs to act, compared to an accusation with no specifics attached.

What evidence should I actually attach?

Enough for someone who has never seen the problem to reproduce or verify it: the exact URL or IP address involved, the date and time you observed it (in UTC, to avoid timezone ambiguity), a screenshot or saved copy of the offending page or message if it's likely to disappear once reported, and any relevant log lines or headers if the report concerns traffic rather than content. NIST's incident handling guidance emphasizes exactly this discipline — precise timestamps and preserved evidence — because abuse desks, like incident responders, can only act on what's documented, not on what you remember having seen.

Should I expect a reply, or action, after sending a report?

Not on a guaranteed timeline for an ordinary abuse report. ICANN's rules require a dedicated 24/7 contact and a 24-hour review specifically for reports of illegal activity submitted by law enforcement or a government-designated authority — not for every report from the general public, which registrars are only required to investigate "reasonably and promptly," a standard with no fixed clock attached. A 2024 amendment to the RAA does require registrars to act on actionable evidence of DNS Abuse specifically, which strengthens the obligation for that category, but silence or a slow response to a general report isn't automatically a sign your report was ignored, just that there's no universal SLA guaranteeing when you'll hear back.

Want AdminKit to watch this for you?

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Huy Nguyen (David), Founder and CEO of Netbase JSC

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Huy Nguyen (David), Founder & CEO, Netbase JSC

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