Is port 23 (Telnet) exposed to the internet, and how do I close it?
AdminKit explains why port 23, Telnet's default port, keeps showing up exposed: it's a plaintext remote-administration protocol with no built-in encryption, still enabled by default on many consumer routers, cameras and NVRs. A device reachable on port 23 lets anyone who finds it try default or weak credentials for a full admin shell.
By AdminKit team, Netbase JSC · Updated
Key takeaways
- Telnet (RFC 854) has no encryption and no authentication of its own. Whatever login prompt you see is the device’s, and the password crosses the network in clear text.
- The listeners on port 23 today are mostly embedded devices: routers, IP cameras, DVRs and NVRs, and older switches and serial gateways.
- The Mirai botnet spread by logging in over Telnet with factory-default passwords. No software flaw was needed.
- AdminKit’s port check tests port 23 on your own public IP and reports it as a high-severity finding if it answers.
Why does port 23 still show up on modern networks?
Telnet (RFC 854, 1983) predates modern encrypted remote-access protocols like SSH by over a decade — FTP, from that same plaintext-by-design era, carries the identical credential problem on a different port — and many embedded device firmware images never dropped either kind of legacy service — it’s cheap to implement and gives manufacturers a working remote-admin console without the overhead of TLS or key-based auth. The protocol itself has no encryption, and on a large share of consumer routers, cameras and NVRs it ships with a default username/password that’s published in the device’s manual or easily found online.
What does an exposed port 23 actually risk?
If port 23 is reachable from the public internet and the device still uses its factory-default or a weak credential, anyone who finds it gets a full administrative shell — the same access level as the device’s own owner. From there an attacker can read configuration (including other credentials stored on the device), change DNS settings to redirect traffic, or install malware. The 2017 academic analysis of the Mirai botnet documented this pattern at internet scale: Mirai’s core technique was scanning the entire IPv4 address space for port 23, then trying roughly 60 hardcoded default username/password pairs — no exploit, just unchanged defaults — which is how it built a botnet of hundreds of thousands of IoT devices in a matter of days.
How do you check your own exposure?
Use AdminKit’s what is my IP tool to confirm your current public IP, then AdminKit’s open ports check tests whether port 23 and the other commonly-exposed device ports respond from outside your own network, only ever against the IP making the request. That fixed, own-IP-only nine-port check is a different design than general-purpose scanners like canyouseeme.org or portchecker.co, which let you type in any host and port — see AdminKit’s comparison of free open port check tools for what each one actually tests.
What does Telnet actually send over the wire?
RFC 854 defines Telnet as a byte stream between two “network virtual terminals”, with a small set of in-band commands for negotiating options such as echo and terminal type. Every command starts with the byte 255, called IAC (“interpret as command”). That is the whole protocol. There is no handshake that proves who the server is, no key exchange, and no field for a password: the login: and Password: prompts are ordinary text printed by the device’s shell, and your answers go back as ordinary text.
Two consequences follow. Anyone on the network path (a shared Wi-Fi, a compromised router upstream, an ISP tap) can read the credentials. And because the protocol has no notion of authentication, the device decides alone how strict it is. Some ask for a password; some drop straight to a root shell.
Most Telnet servers speak first, opening with option negotiation. When you connect with a raw TCP tool rather than a Telnet client, the negotiation bytes show up as a few unreadable characters before the prompt. Example output (documentation address, banner varies by device):
$ nc -v -w 3 203.0.113.5 23
Connection to 203.0.113.5 23 port [tcp/telnet] succeeded!
[a few unprintable option-negotiation bytes]
router login:
Seeing a prompt after those bytes is a strong sign that a Telnet daemon is answering, rather than some other service that happens to sit on port 23.
Which devices tend to leave Telnet on?
| Device family | Why Telnet is there | What to look for in its settings |
|---|---|---|
| Home and small-office routers | Support and diagnostics from the ISP or vendor | A “Telnet” or “remote management” toggle; some firmware hides it |
| IP cameras, DVRs and NVRs | Embedded Linux images ship a small Telnet daemon for factory debugging | Often no setting at all; a firmware update may be the only fix |
| Older managed switches and access points | Telnet was the standard management path before SSH was common | “Management access” or “services” menu; choose SSH only |
| Serial console servers and industrial gateways | Telnet maps a TCP port to a serial line for remote console access | Per-port settings; many also use ports other than 23 |
The USENIX Security 2017 study of the Mirai botnet describes how the malware scanned for Telnet on ports 23 and 2323 and tried a short built-in list of default username and password pairs. The devices it compromised were largely cameras, DVRs and routers. No exploit was involved: the devices accepted the factory credentials because nobody had changed them, and many gave no way to change them.
How is Telnet different from SSH on the same device?
Many devices that offer Telnet also offer SSH, and the choice between them is not a matter of taste.
| Telnet (port 23) | SSH (port 22) | |
|---|---|---|
| Encryption | None | Whole session encrypted |
| Server identity | Not verified | Host key checked by the client |
| Login methods | Whatever the device’s shell prompts for | Passwords, public keys, certificates |
| Defined in | RFC 854 (1983) | RFC 4251 to RFC 4254 (2006) |
SSH still needs care when exposed; see is port 22 (SSH) exposed. But SSH at least protects the password in transit and lets the client detect a server it has not seen before. Telnet does neither, which is why the CISA and FBI advisory AA22-137A groups it with RDP among services that should not be exposed to the internet.
How do you read AdminKit’s result for port 23?
Port 23 is on the port check list. The check runs from AdminKit’s servers against the public IP your browser is using, opens a TCP connection to each listed port with a short timeout, and lists the ports that accepted the connection.
| What the result shows | What it means |
|---|---|
| Port 23 listed as open, high severity, labelled “Telnet — unencrypted remote admin” | Something on your public IP completes a TCP handshake on 23. Find the device behind it. |
| Port 23 not listed as open | No TCP handshake completed from the internet. The check does not distinguish a refused port from a filtered one. |
An open result only proves that a TCP listener exists; it does not log in or read a banner. Confirm which device it is from inside the network. On a Linux-based device or server, ss -ltnp | grep ':23 ' shows the process. For a forwarded port, the router’s port-forwarding and UPnP tables show the internal address it points to. The check also does not test port 2323, which Mirai scanned as well; if you have a device that uses an alternate Telnet port, test it manually from outside your network.
How to fix it
- Change the device’s default credentials immediately — this alone defeats the Mirai-style attack even if the port stays open.
- Disable Telnet management entirely if the device offers SSH or an HTTPS admin panel instead; most modern router and camera firmware has a setting to turn Telnet off.
- Remove any port-forwarding rule or UPnP mapping that exposes port 23 to the internet — legitimate remote administration should go through a VPN or the vendor’s cloud dashboard, not a raw Telnet port forwarded to the world.
- Re-run open ports check afterward to confirm port 23 is no longer reachable from outside.
What if the device has no setting to turn Telnet off?
Some cameras and DVRs run a Telnet daemon that no menu controls. In that case the goal shifts from “disable the service” to “make sure nothing outside can reach it”:
- Delete any port-forward to the device and turn off UPnP on the router, so the device cannot open its own forward later.
- Put the device on a separate network segment (a guest network or VLAN) that can reach only what it needs, such as the NVR or the vendor’s cloud service.
- Check the vendor’s support page for a firmware release that removes or locks the daemon, and apply it.
- If the vendor no longer ships updates for the model, plan to replace it. A device that cannot be patched and cannot be configured will keep the same weakness for as long as it is plugged in.
The step-by-step version, with router examples, is in securing an exposed Telnet device.
For the full walkthrough — including RTSP (port 554), which shows up on the same camera and router hardware for a related reason — see our guide on Telnet and RTSP camera/router exposure.
Defensive use only
Every check this page links to is for assets you own or are explicitly authorized to test. Never scan, probe, or attempt to connect to a network or device you don’t control — AdminKit’s active checks only ever run against the IP making the request or an asset you’ve verified ownership of. See our Disclaimer and Acceptable Use Policy for the full terms.
This guide is general information, not a security audit of your specific network — see our disclaimer for what AdminKit's guidance does and does not commit to.
Frequently asked questions
Why is Telnet still enabled on so many devices in 2026?
It predates encrypted alternatives like SSH by over a decade, and many embedded-device firmware images never removed it — it's cheap to implement, and manufacturers have historically prioritized having some remote console available over replacing it with something more secure.
Is port 23 always Telnet?
23 is IANA's registered Telnet port, but any service can technically run on any port. If a scan shows 23 open, confirm what's actually listening before assuming it's a misconfigured Telnet console.
How is this page different from the Telnet and RTSP guide?
This page is a quick "is port 23 open" explainer. The guide, Telnet and RTSP camera/router exposure, is the full step-by-step fix walkthrough covering both ports and the devices they usually run on.
Will closing port 23 break anything I rely on?
Only if you specifically use Telnet for remote administration from outside your network, which is uncommon today — closing the port at your router or firewall (rather than disabling Telnet on the device's LAN side) stops internet access while local admin access, if you still use it, keeps working.
Sources
- RFC 854 — Telnet Protocol Specification
- Understanding the Mirai Botnet — USENIX Security 2017
- IANA Service Name and Transport Protocol Port Number Registry
- CISA & FBI — Weak Security Controls and Practices Routinely Exploited for Initial Access (AA22-137A)
- RFC 4251 — The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Architecture
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Huy Nguyen (David), Founder & CEO, Netbase JSC
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