What are randomized and locally-administered MAC addresses?
AdminKit explains what randomized and locally-administered MAC addresses are: one bit in a MAC address's first byte marks whether it was factory-assigned by a manufacturer or generated locally, and modern phones deliberately randomize that address per network so the device can't be tracked across networks — which is also why a MAC vendor lookup finds nothing for it.
By AdminKit team, Netbase JSC · Updated
Key takeaways
- One bit in the first byte of a MAC address, the universal/local (X) bit, says whether a manufacturer assigned the address (
0) or it was generated locally (1). RFC 9542 §2.1.1 defines it. - You can read it from the second hex digit:
2,6,AorEmeans a locally administered unicast address. A vendor lookup has nothing to find for those. - Android 10+, iOS/iPadOS 14+ and macOS Sequoia 15+ use a private, locally administered Wi-Fi address per network by default. Windows offers the same as an opt-in setting.
- Randomization stops tracking across networks. It does not always mean a new address on every connection: Android and Apple keep a fixed address per network in most cases.
- Fixed infrastructure such as switches, printers and cameras normally keeps its factory MAC, so OUI lookup still works well for that kind of device.
Which bit decides whether a MAC address has a vendor at all?
The universal/local bit, the second-lowest bit of the first byte. Every MAC address is 48 bits, and the very first byte carries special-purpose bits as well as the start of the OUI. The one that matters for identifying a device’s manufacturer is the universal/local bit (the X bit), defined in RFC 9542 §2.1.1 (which obsoletes the older RFC 7042 that defined the same bit): zero means the address is global, drawn from a block IEEE assigned to a specific manufacturer; one means the address is local, generated outside any vendor assignment entirely.
The lowest bit of the same byte is the M bit, also called the group or multicast bit: 0 for an address that belongs to one interface, 1 for a multicast or broadcast address. RFC 9542 names the four low bits of the first byte like this:
First byte of a MAC address, most significant bit on the left
bit: 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
. . . . Z Y X M
| | | +-- M: 0 = unicast, 1 = group (multicast/broadcast)
| | +------ X: 0 = global (vendor-assigned), 1 = local
+---+---------- Y, Z: SLAP quadrant, only meaningful when X = 1
In practice, you can read this straight off the hex: if the second hex digit of a MAC address is 2, 3, 6, 7, A, B, E or F, the local bit is set and the address has no registered vendor by definition — not because a lookup failed to find one, but because there was never a manufacturer assignment to find in the first place. The full split by second hex digit:
| Second hex digit | X bit | M bit | Meaning |
|---|---|---|---|
0, 4, 8, C | 0 | 0 | Global unicast: a vendor-assigned address for one interface |
1, 5, 9, D | 0 | 1 | Global multicast |
2, 6, A, E | 1 | 0 | Local unicast: where randomized Wi-Fi addresses land |
3, 7, B, F | 1 | 1 | Local multicast, such as IPv6’s 33:33:… addresses |
A worked example using 00:00:5e:00:53:01, a value RFC 9542 §2.1.4 reserves for documentation. Its first byte is 00, binary 0000 0000, so the X bit is 0 and the address is global. Set the X bit (add 0x02) and you get 02:00:5e:00:53:01. That is a locally administered address with the same remaining 40 bits, shown here only as an example. It no longer belongs to the owner of the 00-00-5E block (IANA), or to anyone else.
This is the same bit AdminKit’s MAC vendor lookup checks to decide whether to attempt a vendor match at all, as covered in how to read a MAC vendor lookup result. The tool reports “Locally administered” and “Multicast” as separate yes/no fields, which map directly to the X and M bits.
How does IEEE 802c structure the local address space?
It splits the local half into four quadrants using two more bits. Before IEEE 802c-2017, the entire “local” half of the address space (every address with the universal/local bit set) was just one undifferentiated pool, free for anyone to generate addresses into with no coordination against collisions. 802c’s Structured Local Address Plan (SLAP) adds that coordination by using two further bits (Y and Z, per RFC 9542 §2.1.1) to split the local space into four quadrants:
| Y bit | Z bit | Second hex digit (unicast) | Quadrant | Intended use |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | 0 | 2 | Administratively Assigned | Manual, ad-hoc local assignment (e.g. a lab’s own test addresses) |
| 0 | 1 | A | Extended Local | A larger local space for holders of an IEEE-assigned Company ID (CID) |
| 1 | 0 | 6 | Reserved | Not currently assigned a use |
| 1 | 1 | E | Standard Assigned | Addresses an IEEE 802 protocol itself specifies |
SLAP is optional, not mandatory: an implementation that sets the local bit but has no reason to coordinate with anyone else’s local address space is free to randomize the remaining bits without following the quadrant structure at all, and most consumer MAC randomization does exactly that. Android, for example, randomizes all 46 bits other than X and M, so the Y and Z bits are random too and its addresses can fall into any of the four quadrants. A second digit of 6 on a phone does not mean it uses a “Reserved” address on purpose.
Why do phones randomize, and what actually changes?
To stop a fixed hardware address from linking a device’s activity across networks. Android’s own documentation describes its approach plainly: the locally-administered bit is set to 1, the unicast (group) bit is set to 0, and the other 46 bits are randomized, with no mention of following a specific SLAP quadrant. Apple’s support page gives the same reason: a device that uses the same Wi-Fi MAC everywhere lets network operators and observers relate that address to its activity and location over time.
None of this is MAC spoofing in the deceptive sense — it’s a documented, vendor-shipped default aimed specifically at defeating the kind of cross-network tracking a stable, vendor-identifiable MAC address would otherwise enable. What each platform does by default, according to its vendor’s documentation:
| Platform | Default | When the address changes |
|---|---|---|
| Android 10 and later (AOSP) | Randomized per network, “persistent” type | Derived from the network profile (SSID, security type, or FQDN for Passpoint); stays the same until a factory reset, even if you forget and re-add the network |
| Android 12 and later | Same, plus “non-persistent” in some cases | Used when an app requests it for its suggested network, or on open networks without a captive portal if the device maker enabled that option (off by default). A new address is drawn at the start of a connection if the current one is over 24 hours old, or the DHCP lease expired and the device was away over 4 hours |
| iOS/iPadOS 18, macOS Sequoia 15, watchOS 11 and later (Apple) | Private address per network; Fixed or Rotating | Fixed is the default on WPA2 or stronger networks and does not rotate. Rotating is the default on weak or open networks and changes every two weeks |
| Earlier iOS/iPadOS 14+ and watchOS 7+ | Private address per network, on or off | A new address after a network reset, or if the device has not joined that network for six weeks |
| Windows (Microsoft) | Opt-in “Random hardware addresses”, if the Wi-Fi hardware supports it | Used while scanning and connecting; can be enabled for all networks or for one known network |
Two details are easy to miss. First, the Android documentation explains why “persistent” is the default: some networks rely on a stable address to remember a device, for example to skip a captive-portal login screen again or to apply parental controls. Second, Apple notes that erasing the device or resetting network settings gives it a different private address the next time it joins. A MAC-based rule built around one of these addresses can stop matching after a reset, with no change on the network side.
The same logic extends to IPv6: a device that derives its SLAAC interface identifier from a randomized MAC rather than EUI-64 avoids embedding that same trackable identifier in its IPv6 address too. Modified EUI-64, from RFC 4291 Appendix A, copies the MAC into the address and flips the X bit, so the factory MAC would otherwise appear in every IPv6 address the device builds; see IPv6 SLAAC and EUI-64 addressing for the bit-level steps.
How do you see which MAC address a device is using?
Ask the device itself; the address it shows on the Wi-Fi interface is the one the network sees. Commands that print an interface’s current address on common systems (replace the interface name with yours):
ip link show wlan0 # Linux
ifconfig en0 ether # macOS
Get-NetAdapter | Format-Table Name, MacAddress # Windows PowerShell
On Android and Apple devices, the private address setting lives in the details screen for each Wi-Fi network in Settings, which is also the place to check it. Example output from the Linux command (illustrative, example MAC value with the local bit set):
3: wlan0: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 state UP mode DORMANT
link/ether 02:00:5e:00:53:01 brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff
The second hex digit is 2, so this interface is using a locally administered address. On a router’s client list or in a DHCP lease table, the same check works for any client: a 2, 6, A or E in that position means there is no vendor to look up.
What mistakes do people make with locally administered addresses?
| Mistake | Why it is wrong | What to do instead |
|---|---|---|
| Treating “unknown vendor” as a sign of a rogue device | Every randomized phone or laptop has no vendor by design | Check the local bit first; then look at hostname, connection time and signal |
Reading 33:33:… as a randomized client | RFC 9542 §2.3.1 and RFC 2464 §7 reserve 33-33 for IPv6 multicast; both X and M bits are set | Ignore it for device inventory; it is a destination, not a device |
| Assuming a phone’s address changes on every connection | Android’s default and Apple’s Fixed mode keep one address per network | Expect a stable address per network, with changes after resets or under Rotating |
| Assuming every local address follows SLAP | SLAP is optional and most randomization ignores it | Read only the X and M bits unless you know the source follows SLAP |
| Building a long-lived allow-list from client MACs | Resets, forgotten networks and rotation all change the address | Use 802.1X or per-user credentials for access control |
What does this mean for identifying devices on a network?
OUI-based identification still works for infrastructure and has mostly stopped working for consumer Wi-Fi clients. Fixed infrastructure — routers, access points, switches, printers, most IP cameras and other IoT gear — generally has no reason to randomize and keeps shipping with its real, factory-assigned MAC address, so OUI-based vendor identification continues to work reliably for exactly the device category it’s most useful for: unfamiliar hardware with no hostname to go by.
If you’re trying to build something that depends on recognizing a specific phone or laptop reliably — a MAC-based allow-list, or an inventory built from OUI matches — don’t rely on randomized clients cooperating; options that don’t depend on a stable hardware address, such as 802.1X/WPA2-Enterprise per-user authentication, hold up where MAC-based identification increasingly does not. Apple’s page also notes that organizations can use a managed network profile to turn the feature off for enrolled devices on their own Wi-Fi. See using MAC vendor lookup to spot a rogue device for how to work within these limits when you’re trying to identify an unfamiliar entry in a router’s client list rather than build a durable allow-list. This guide is part of AdminKit’s DNS cluster, alongside its other free lookup tools and address/name explainers.
This guide is general information, not a security audit of your specific network — see our disclaimer for what AdminKit's guidance does and does not commit to.
Frequently asked questions
Which bit marks a MAC address as locally-administered, and how do I read it?
The second-least-significant bit of a MAC address's first byte (also called the X bit, or universal/local bit). In the first byte's hex digits, that bit lives in the second hex digit, so an easy practical check is whether that digit is 2, 3, 6, 7, A, B, E or F — a locally-administered address — versus 0, 1, 4, 5, 8, 9, C or D, a globally-assigned, vendor-registered address. RFC 9542 §2.1.1 is the current definition (it obsoletes the older RFC 7042, which defined the same bit).
What is the IEEE 802c Structured Local Address Plan (SLAP)?
IEEE 802c-2017 is an optional amendment that subdivides the local address space (every address with the universal/local bit set to one) into four quadrants using two further bits, so multiple parties can generate local addresses without colliding: Administratively Assigned (for manual, ad-hoc local assignment), Standard Assigned (for addresses an IEEE 802 protocol itself specifies), Extended Local (for holders of an IEEE Company ID who want a larger local space of their own), and a Reserved quadrant for future use. Because SLAP is optional, not every locally-administered address follows it — plenty of software, including OS-level MAC randomization, just sets the local bit and ignores the quadrant structure.
Do phones follow IEEE 802c's SLAP quadrants when randomizing their MAC address?
Not necessarily. Android's own documentation describes its randomization as setting the locally-administered bit to 1 and the unicast (group) bit to 0, then randomizing the remaining 46 bits — it doesn't describe conforming to a specific SLAP quadrant. Treat SLAP as the IEEE-defined structure available to anyone generating local addresses deliberately (for example, a lab assigning its own test MACs), not as a guarantee about what any specific vendor's randomization actually does.
Does every device randomize its MAC address now?
No — randomization is mainly a Wi-Fi client behavior on general-purpose end-user devices. Android 10+ randomizes the Wi-Fi MAC per network by default, iOS/iPadOS 14+ does the same through Private Wi-Fi Address (with a per-network fixed or rotating choice added in iOS/iPadOS 18), and Windows offers an opt-in 'random hardware addresses' setting. Fixed infrastructure — routers, switches, access points, printers, IP cameras and most other IoT devices — has little reason to randomize and typically keeps its real, factory-assigned MAC, which is why OUI-based vendor lookup still works reliably for that category of device.
If MAC randomization breaks OUI lookup, how do network admins identify or allow-list a phone?
Not by OUI, reliably. A phone that randomizes its MAC per network presents a different, vendor-less address to every network it joins (and, on some OS versions, can rotate that address periodically within the same network too), so a MAC-based allow-list or OUI-based identification scheme built for a specific device will silently stop matching it. Practical alternatives are device-level controls that don't depend on a stable MAC at all: 802.1X/WPA2-Enterprise per-user authentication, DHCP reservations keyed to a hostname where the client cooperates, or simply accepting that consumer Wi-Fi clients are not reliably identifiable by hardware address anymore.
Is a randomized MAC address the same thing as MAC spoofing?
Related, but not the same intent. Both involve presenting an address other than the one burned into the hardware. OS-level randomization is a built-in, non-deceptive privacy default applied automatically and consistently by the device itself, documented by the OS vendor. MAC spoofing is a deliberate, manual act (by the device's own user or an attacker) to impersonate a specific other address, usually to bypass a MAC-based filter or access control. The mechanism — setting the address in software rather than using the hardware default — is the same; the purpose and transparency are not.
Sources
- RFC 9542 — IANA Considerations and IETF Protocol and Documentation Usage for IEEE 802 Parameters, §2.1.1
- IEEE 802c-2017 — Local and Metropolitan Area Networks: Overview and Architecture, Amendment 2: Local MAC Address Usage
- Android Open Source Project — Wi-Fi MAC randomization behavior
- Apple Support — Using a private Wi-Fi address in iOS, iPadOS, and macOS
- Microsoft Support — Connect to a Wi-Fi network in Windows (random hardware addresses)
- RFC 2464 — Transmission of IPv6 Packets over Ethernet Networks, §7 (33-33 multicast mapping)
- RFC 4291 — IP Version 6 Addressing Architecture, Appendix A (modified EUI-64)
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