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DNSKEY record

What is DNSKEY record?

A DNSKEY record, defined in RFC 4034, publishes the public key a zone uses to sign its own DNS records under DNSSEC, which a validating resolver fetches to verify the zone's RRSIG signatures. AdminKit's DNSSEC guide covers confirming a domain publishes the DS, DNSKEY and RRSIG records a resolver needs.

By AdminKit team, Netbase JSC · Updated

A DNSKEY record publishes the public key a zone uses to sign its own DNS records under DNSSEC, defined alongside the rest of the DNSSEC record set in RFC 4034. A zone’s authoritative servers hold the matching private key, chosen from one of the signing algorithms listed in IANA’s DNSSEC Algorithm Numbers registry, and use it to generate RRSIG records — the actual signatures over other record sets, a process RFC 4035 specifies — while a validating resolver fetches the DNSKEY record to verify those signatures, and separately checks a DS record at the parent zone to confirm the DNSKEY itself hasn’t been substituted by an attacker. A zone typically publishes two: a Zone Signing Key used for day-to-day signing, and a Key Signing Key that signs the DNSKEY record set itself and is the one hashed into the parent’s DS record. Losing track of a key rollover here is a common way a signed zone goes dark for validating resolvers. ISC’s BIND DNSSEC Guide shows the split in practice: of the two key pairs BIND generates for a zone, one is labelled the zone-signing key and the other the key-signing key, and the KSK’s DNSKEY record carries the flags value 257. See the DS record entry for how that parent-zone hash is what actually anchors a DNSKEY to the chain of trust. A DNSKEY and its RRSIG signatures prove a record set that does exist is genuine; proving a queried name doesn’t exist is a separate job handled by an NSEC or NSEC3 record instead.

The two DNSKEY roles in a signed zone:

  • Zone Signing Key (ZSK) — signs the zone’s day-to-day records, rotated more often.
  • Key Signing Key (KSK) — signs the DNSKEY record set itself, hashed into the parent’s DS record.
  • Losing track of a rollover between the two is a common way a signed zone goes dark.

AdminKit groups dNSKEY record under its DNS cluster — browse the AdminKit glossary index for other related terms.

Frequently asked questions

Why does a signed zone usually publish two DNSKEY records?

A Zone Signing Key (ZSK) signs the zone's day-to-day records and is rotated more often; a Key Signing Key (KSK) signs the DNSKEY record set itself and is the one hashed into the parent's DS record. Splitting the roles lets the more frequently used ZSK rotate without touching the parent-zone DS record.

What's a common way a signed zone goes dark for validating resolvers?

Losing track of a key rollover between the Zone Signing Key and Key Signing Key -- if the published DNSKEY record set no longer matches what the parent's DS record expects, validating resolvers can no longer confirm the zone's signatures and treat it as broken.

What does a DNSKEY record prove, and what doesn't it prove?

A DNSKEY and its RRSIG signatures prove a record set that does exist is genuine. Proving a queried name doesn't exist is a separate job, handled by an NSEC or NSEC3 record instead.

How does a DNSKEY record relate to a DS record?

A DS record published in the parent zone holds a hash of the child's DNSKEY, which is what actually anchors the DNSKEY to the chain of trust -- without a matching DS record at the parent, a DNSKEY on its own can't be verified as genuine.