RRSIG record
What is RRSIG record?
An RRSIG record, defined in RFC 4034, carries the DNSSEC signature over a specific set of DNS records, letting a validating resolver confirm nothing was altered since the zone owner signed it. AdminKit's DNSSEC guide explains how one expired RRSIG signature can take an otherwise-unchanged zone offline for validating resolvers.
By AdminKit team, Netbase JSC · Updated
An RRSIG record carries the digital signature DNSSEC attaches to a specific set of DNS records — all the A records for a name, for instance — so a validating resolver can confirm that set hasn’t been altered or forged since the zone’s owner signed it. It is defined, like the rest of the DNSSEC record types, in RFC 4034 and listed as RR type 46 in IANA’s DNS Parameters registry, and a resolver verifies it following the validation process RFC 4035 describes, using the public key published in the zone’s DNSKEY record, which it has in turn confirmed is genuine through a DS record at the parent zone — the same RRSIG/DNSKEY/DS validation chain NIST’s DNS deployment guide walks through for operators deploying DNSSEC. Each RRSIG carries an explicit validity window, and a signature that has expired without being re-signed causes every validating resolver to treat the covered records as unverifiable, taking the zone offline for DNSSEC-aware resolvers even though the underlying records themselves never changed — a common cause of a signed domain breaking unexpectedly. Signing tools handle this by re-signing on a schedule: the BIND 9 DNSSEC Guide explains that its dnssec-policy setting turns on automatic maintenance that re-signs the zone as signatures expire. That validity window is only meaningful if the validating resolver’s own clock is accurate — see NTP (Network Time Protocol) for how a resolver keeps its clock in sync in the first place.
RRSIG record is part of AdminKit’s DNS cluster; the full AdminKit glossary lists other related terms.
Frequently asked questions
What does an RRSIG record carry?
It carries the DNSSEC digital signature over a specific set of DNS records, as defined in RFC 4034.
What happens if an RRSIG signature expires without being renewed?
Every validating resolver treats the covered records as unverifiable, which takes the zone offline for DNSSEC-aware resolvers even though the underlying records never changed.
How does a resolver verify an RRSIG record?
Following the validation process RFC 4035 describes, using the public key published in the zone's DNSKEY record, which it has already confirmed via a DS record at the parent zone.
Why does a resolver's clock accuracy matter for RRSIG validation?
Each RRSIG carries an explicit validity window, so a resolver with an inaccurate clock can wrongly treat a still-valid signature as expired, or vice versa -- see NTP for how a resolver keeps its clock in sync.