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What are CAA records, and how do they limit who can issue your TLS certificates?

A Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) record is a DNS record that names which certificate authorities may issue TLS certificates for your domain; every publicly trusted CA must check for one before issuing, so a misconfigured CAA record can silently block your own renewals. AdminKit's DNS lookup tool shows a domain's current CAA records in seconds.

By AdminKit team, Netbase JSC · Updated

Key takeaways

  • A CAA record lists the certificate authorities allowed to issue TLS certificates for your domain. Publicly trusted CAs must check it before they issue.
  • No CAA record means any public CA may issue. One issue line per CA you use narrows that to your own providers.
  • A subdomain with no CAA record of its own inherits the closest parent’s record, so one record at the apex covers the whole domain.
  • The usual failure is self-inflicted: you change CA, forget the CAA record, and the next renewal is refused.

Why do CAA records exist?

CAA is one of several DNS-level controls covered in AdminKit’s DNS cluster, alongside the other record types and lookups that shape what a domain actually publishes. Before CAA records, any publicly trusted certificate authority could issue a TLS certificate for any domain, as long as the requester passed that CA’s own domain-validation check — usually proving control of a DNS record, an email address at the domain, or a file on the web server. That design means a domain owner has no direct say in which CAs are allowed to issue for their name; the only constraint is each CA’s own validation process, and different CAs have historically had different levels of rigor and different track records of mistakes or compromises. RFC 8659 closes that gap by letting a domain publish, in its own DNS, an explicit allow-list of CAs. The CA/Browser Forum’s Baseline Requirements — the rules publicly trusted CAs must follow to stay trusted by browsers — make checking CAA records mandatory before issuance, not optional best practice. That mandate is what gives CAA its teeth: it isn’t a suggestion a CA can ignore, it’s a condition of being in the trusted root program at all.

What does a CAA record look like?

A CAA record has three parts: a flag, a tag, and a value. The two tags that matter for most domains are issue (which CA may issue standard certificates) and issuewild (which CA may issue wildcard certificates, checked separately so a domain can allow wildcards from a different, or no, CA). A typical record authorizing Let’s Encrypt — whose certificates are issued automatically over the ACME protocol rather than through a manual request — looks like:

example.com.  CAA  0 issue "letsencrypt.org"

A domain can publish multiple issue records to permit more than one CA, or publish 0 issue ";" to explicitly permit no CA to issue at all — a deliberate “this domain should never get a new publicly trusted certificate” statement, sometimes used on domains that are parked or intentionally never served over public TLS. There’s also an iodef tag that names a URL or email address a CA should notify if it receives (and refuses) an unauthorized issuance request — a built-in early-warning signal most domains never configure, even though it costs nothing to set up.

PartExampleWhat it does
Flag0 or 128128 marks the property as critical: a CA that doesn’t understand the tag must refuse to issue. Most records use 0.
issue tag0 issue "letsencrypt.org"Names a CA that may issue certificates, including wildcards unless issuewild is also present.
issuewild tag0 issuewild ";"Applies only to wildcard certificates and, when present, overrides issue for them. ";" allows no CA.
iodef tag0 iodef "mailto:security@example.com"Tells a CA where to report a request it refused because of your CAA policy.
Parameters0 issue "letsencrypt.org; accounturi=..."Optional extras after a ;. RFC 8657 defines accounturi and validationmethods for CAs that use ACME.

The value in an issue line is the CA’s own issuer domain name, which is not always its brand name. Let’s Encrypt uses letsencrypt.org, for example. Each CA publishes the value it checks for in its documentation, and that is the value to copy.

How does a CA find the CAA record for a subdomain?

A CA doesn’t only look at the exact name on the certificate. RFC 8659 defines a “relevant RRset”: the CA queries CAA for the name itself, and if nothing is there it removes the leftmost label and tries the parent, then the parent’s parent, until it finds a CAA record or runs out of labels. The first set it finds is the policy that applies.

Certificate requested for: shop.eu.example.com
  CAA shop.eu.example.com?  -> no records
  CAA eu.example.com?       -> no records
  CAA example.com?          -> 0 issue "letsencrypt.org"   <- this policy applies

In practice, a single CAA record at your apex covers every subdomain that doesn’t publish its own. It also means a subdomain can publish its own set to override the apex. That is useful when one team uses a different CA, but easy to forget: a stale CAA record on a subdomain keeps applying there even after you update the apex.

Separately, RFC 8657 lets a domain pin issuance to a specific ACME account (accounturi) or to specific validation methods (validationmethods, such as dns-01). With an account binding, someone who passes domain validation at the same CA from a different account is still refused. Support depends on the CA; Let’s Encrypt documents both parameters on its CAA page.

What does CAA protect against, and what doesn’t it?

CAA closes one specific gap: it stops a different, unauthorized CA from issuing a valid certificate for your domain, whether because an attacker tricked that CA’s domain-validation process, exploited a bug in it, or because that CA’s own infrastructure was compromised. It’s a narrow but real risk — publicly documented CA mis-issuance incidents are the reason this record type exists at all, including cases where an attacker used BGP hijacking to reroute traffic and pass a CA’s domain-validation check well enough to obtain a fraudulent certificate.

What it does not do: protect against your own authorized CA being compromised, protect against someone who already controls your DNS (they can simply rewrite or delete the CAA record before requesting a certificate, as covered in our DNS hijacking guide), or validate anything about the certificate after it’s issued. CAA is purely a pre-issuance gate checked by CAs, not a runtime check performed by browsers or clients connecting to your server. If you want to verify what a currently-issued certificate for your domain actually contains — issuer, expiry, chain validity — that’s a separate check, covered in our guide on reading a TLS/SSL certificate check result.

Which CAA mistakes block your own certificates?

CAA failures rarely announce themselves as DNS problems. They show up as a renewal error from your CA or your ACME client, often weeks after the record was changed. These are the patterns worth ruling out first:

MistakeWhat you’ll seeFix
Switched CA, CAA still names the old oneThe new CA refuses issuance, citing CAAAdd the new CA’s issuer domain before the first request; remove the old one once it’s no longer used.
Second provider not listed (CDN, hosting platform, mail service)That provider’s automatic certificate stops renewingList every CA any of your providers use for your names.
issuewild added later without your wildcard CAWildcard renewals fail; normal certificates still workAdd the wildcard CA to issuewild too.
Old CAA record on a subdomainOnly that subdomain fails, even though the apex is correctUpdate or remove the subdomain’s own CAA set.
DNS server errors on CAA queriesIssuance fails with a lookup error rather than a policy refusalAsk your DNS provider; a server must answer CAA queries, even with an empty answer.

How do you check and set up CAA records?

  1. Check what’s currently published. Use AdminKit’s DNS lookup tool to query your domain’s CAA records. Many domains have none at all, which is valid (any CA may issue) but means you’re not using this protection. To write a new set, AdminKit’s CAA record generator builds the zone-file lines for the CAs you choose, an optional wildcard rule and an iodef address in your browser; you still publish them at your DNS provider yourself.
  2. Confirm it matches every CA you actually use. If you use more than one CA — for example a paid EV certificate from one provider and Let’s Encrypt for internal services — list both. Missing one is the single most common cause of a failed renewal.
  3. Check issuewild if you use wildcard certificates. With only issue lines, those CAs may also issue wildcards. Once any issuewild line exists, it replaces issue for wildcard requests, so a CA listed under issue but not under issuewild can no longer issue your wildcard certificate.
  4. Set a realistic TTL. Like any DNS record, a CAA change takes effect only after cached copies expire; see our guide on DNS propagation and TTL if you’re planning a CA migration and need the old record gone before the new CA’s next issuance attempt.
  5. Consider iodef if your DNS provider supports it, so you get notified of any issuance attempt your CAA record blocks — a free tripwire for exactly the attack CAA exists to stop.

What should you check alongside CAA?

CAA controls who is allowed to issue a certificate; it says nothing about whether a specific certificate your server presents today is valid, expiring soon, or chained correctly. Run AdminKit’s SSL/TLS certificate check to verify the live certificate itself, and see reading a TLS/SSL certificate check result for how to interpret it. If a CA does mis-issue despite CAA, Certificate Transparency logs are how that becomes visible after the fact, and the HSTS preload list — see our guide on HSTS and HSTS preload — separately protects a first-ever connection from being downgraded to plain HTTP in the first place.

This guide is general information, not a security audit of your specific network — see our disclaimer for what AdminKit's guidance does and does not commit to.

Frequently asked questions

What is a CAA record in plain terms?

It's a DNS record type, defined by RFC 8659, that lists which certificate authorities (CAs) — like Let's Encrypt, DigiCert, or Sectigo — are permitted to issue a TLS certificate for your domain. A CA that isn't listed is required to refuse the request, not just warn about it.

Do I need a CAA record if I only use one certificate authority?

You don't strictly need one, but it's a cheap defensive layer: without a CAA record, any publicly trusted CA can issue a certificate for your domain if someone manages to pass that CA's domain-validation check (often just proving control of a DNS record or a file on your web server). A CAA record narrows that to only the CA you actually use, so a validation bypass or social-engineering attempt against a different CA is refused outright.

Can a CAA record stop someone who has already compromised my DNS?

No. CAA is checked by the certificate authority at issuance time using the same DNS your domain already publishes, so an attacker who controls your DNS can simply add their own CAA entry — or remove yours — before requesting a certificate. CAA protects against a CA being tricked or compromised independently of you, not against your own DNS being hijacked; see our guide on DNS hijacking for that separate risk.

What happens if I set a CAA record wrong and lock out my own CA?

Your next certificate renewal will fail. This is the most common real-world CAA mistake: a domain sets a CAA record naming one CA, then switches providers (e.g., from a paid CA to Let's Encrypt, or vice versa) without updating the record. The new CA's issuance request gets refused by its own CAA check, and the failure usually surfaces as a cryptic renewal error rather than an obvious DNS problem.

Does a CAA record affect which browsers trust my certificate?

No — CAA only constrains issuance, checked once by the CA before it signs a certificate. It has no effect on how browsers validate a certificate afterward; that's governed entirely by the certificate chain, expiry, and hostname match, which you can inspect with AdminKit's SSL/TLS check tool.

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Huy Nguyen (David), Founder and CEO of Netbase JSC

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Huy Nguyen (David), Founder & CEO, Netbase JSC

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