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BGP hijacking

What is BGP hijacking?

BGP hijacking is when a network operator falsely announces, via the Border Gateway Protocol, that it owns a block of IP addresses it does not actually control, rerouting other networks' traffic through it. AdminKit's Whois tool checks who actually holds an IP block to help spot a hijack.

By AdminKit team, Netbase JSC · Updated

BGP hijacking is when a network operator falsely sends a BGP announcement, via the Border Gateway Protocol, claiming it owns a block of IP addresses it doesn’t actually control — a deliberate forgery of origin, unlike a BGP route leak, where a genuinely authorized announcement simply propagates beyond the scope it was meant to stay within, usually from a misconfiguration rather than an attack. Because BGP was designed for an era of mutual trust between operators, other networks often accept the false announcement and start routing traffic for that address block through the hijacker, sometimes for minutes, sometimes for hours. The traffic can be silently dropped, inspected, or redirected to a lookalike service before being passed on, which makes hijacking useful for both outages and interception. Defenses include RPKI Route Origin Authorization (ROA) validation and route filtering by transit providers — NIST’s own guidance on securing interdomain routing recommends the same RPKI-based approach; for a leak or hijack that keeps a valid origin AS while forging the path in between, ASPA validation of each AS’s authorized upstream providers catches what ROA-based validation alone cannot. Adoption of either is still incomplete worldwide. Cloudflare’s Is BGP safe yet? tracker follows which ISPs and transit providers now reject RPKI-invalid routes and lets users test whether their own ISP does. Victims usually learn about an incident from routing-monitoring services or from their own traffic suddenly taking an unexpected path. RPKI’s infrastructure is defined in RFC 6480 (also tracked on the IETF Datatracker), and broader operational defenses against hijacking are catalogued in RFC 7454 (BGP Operations and Security).

AdminKit groups bGP hijacking under its IP & network cluster — browse the AdminKit glossary index for other related terms.

Frequently asked questions

Is BGP hijacking the same as a BGP route leak?

No -- hijacking is a deliberate forgery of origin, where a network falsely claims to own address space it doesn't control, while a route leak is a genuinely authorized announcement that simply propagates beyond the scope it was meant to stay within, usually from a misconfiguration rather than an attack.

What can happen to traffic rerouted through a hijacker?

It can be silently dropped, inspected, or redirected to a lookalike service before being passed on, which makes hijacking useful for both outages and interception.

Does RPKI stop every kind of hijack?

Not every kind -- RPKI Route Origin Authorization (ROA) validation catches a forged origin AS, but for a leak or hijack that keeps a valid origin AS while forging the path in between, ASPA validation of each AS's authorized upstream providers is needed to catch what ROA alone can't.

How do victims typically find out about a hijack?

Usually from routing-monitoring services or from their own traffic suddenly taking an unexpected path, rather than from any automatic alert at the time it happens.