BGP route leak
What is BGP route leak?
A BGP route leak, as RFC 7908 defines it, is a route announcement that propagates beyond the scope its sender, receiver or an AS along the path intended, most often from an accidental misconfiguration rather than a deliberate attack. AdminKit's Whois/RDAP tool looks up the ASN and network operator behind a route, the relationships a leak crosses without authorization.
By AdminKit team, Netbase JSC · Updated
A BGP route leak is the propagation of a BGP announcement beyond the scope its sender, receiver, or an AS along the path intended, as RFC 7908 (also tracked on the IETF Datatracker) defines it — most commonly a network accidentally re-announcing routes learned from one provider to another, instead of keeping them local, in violation of ordinary routing policy. That distinguishes a leak from BGP hijacking: a hijack forges which network originates a route, while a leak propagates a genuine, correctly originated route to networks that were never supposed to see it, usually through a configuration mistake rather than malicious intent — which is also why Route Origin Validation under RFC 6811 cannot catch most leaks: it “only attempts to verify the origin” AS, not the path a leaked route traveled. RFC 7908 catalogs six distinct leak types, from a multihomed customer re-exposing one provider’s routes to another, to a route re-originated under a different AS path, several illustrated with real incidents that caused large-scale outages — outages NIST’s own interdomain routing security guidance cites as motivation for RPKI-based defenses. ASPA validation, checking the authorized provider relationship between each AS pair in a path, is one of the few defenses that can catch a leak directly, since the leaked route’s origin AS is often still technically valid.
AdminKit groups bGP route leak under its IP & network cluster — browse the AdminKit glossary index for other related terms.
Frequently asked questions
What's the difference between a BGP route leak and BGP hijacking?
A hijack forges which network originates a route; a leak propagates a genuine, correctly originated route beyond the scope it was meant for, usually by accident rather than malice.
Is a BGP route leak always an attack?
No -- RFC 7908 defines it as usually accidental, most often a misconfigured network re-announcing routes learned from one provider to another instead of keeping them local.
Why can't Route Origin Validation catch most route leaks?
RFC 6811 says ROV "only attempts to verify the origin" AS of a route, not the path it traveled, so a leaked route with a technically valid origin passes ROV unnoticed.
What actually stops a BGP route leak?
ASPA validation, which checks the authorized provider relationship between each AS pair in a path, is one of the few defenses that can catch a leak directly since its origin AS is often still valid.