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BGP announcement

What is BGP announcement?

A BGP announcement is a message, defined by RFC 4271, that a network's router sends its neighbors declaring it can route traffic to a given IP block, identified by its ASN. AdminKit's WHOIS lookup shows which network operator and ASN a given IP address's BGP announcements actually point to.

By AdminKit team, Netbase JSC · Updated

A BGP announcement is a message, defined by the Border Gateway Protocol in RFC 4271, that one network operator’s router sends to its neighbors declaring it can route traffic to a given block of IP addresses, identified by its ASN (assigned from the IANA AS numbers registry). Every other network on the internet that wants to reach that address block learns the path to it only because some chain of BGP announcements, hop by hop, advertised a route there — there’s no central map of the internet’s routing, just the accumulated, mutually trusted announcements every network makes to the ones it connects to. Aggregating several contiguous blocks into one larger advertised route — supernetting — is what keeps the number of these announcements from growing in lockstep with every small allocation ever made. BGP trusts these announcements by default, with no built-in cryptographic proof that an announcing network actually controls the addresses it claims, which is what makes BGP hijacking possible: a network can announce a block of IP addresses it doesn’t operate, and if the announcement propagates, some portion of the internet’s traffic for those addresses gets misdirected to it instead of the legitimate operator. A RPKI Route Origin Authorization lets a router check an incoming announcement’s origin AS and prefix against a signed record of who is actually authorized to announce it, instead of trusting the announcement outright — ARIN’s own RPKI program is one Regional Internet Registry’s implementation of that signed record. Because the routing system has no built-in security mechanisms, route collectors such as the RIPE NCC’s Routing Information Service (RIS) gather BGP data to make these announcements observable. An operator can also tag an announcement with a BGP community, a value neighboring networks can match on to apply routing policy to it without a bespoke filter for every case.

A BGP announcement at a glance:

  • Declares a router can route traffic to one IP block, identified by its ASN.
  • Trusted by default — BGP has no built-in proof the announcer actually controls that block.
  • Checked against a signed RPKI ROA where one exists, instead of trusted outright.

AdminKit groups bGP announcement under its IP & network cluster — browse the AdminKit glossary index for other related terms.

Frequently asked questions

What does a BGP announcement declare?

That the announcing router can route traffic to a given block of IP addresses, identified by its ASN.

Does BGP verify that an announcer actually controls the addresses it announces?

No -- BGP trusts announcements by default, with no built-in cryptographic proof, which is what makes BGP hijacking possible.

How can a router check a BGP announcement against who is actually authorized to make it?

Against a signed RPKI Route Origin Authorization stating which AS is authorized to announce a given prefix, instead of trusting the announcement outright.

What keeps the number of BGP announcements from growing with every small address allocation?

Supernetting -- aggregating several contiguous blocks into one larger advertised route.