RPKI ROA (Route Origin Authorization)
What is RPKI ROA (Route Origin Authorization)?
An RPKI Route Origin Authorization (ROA), defined in RFC 6482, is a signed object stating which AS number may originate routing announcements for an IP prefix, letting routers validate BGP announcements cryptographically. AdminKit's WHOIS tool shows who holds a block -- the same registry data a ROA's issuer is authorized against.
By AdminKit team, Netbase JSC · Updated
A Route Origin Authorization (ROA) is a cryptographically signed object, defined in RFC 6482 — also tracked on its IETF Datatracker page — under the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) architecture of RFC 6480, that states which autonomous system number is authorized to originate routing announcements for a specific IP prefix, up to a stated maximum prefix length. A regional internet registry — ARIN, RIPE NCC, APNIC, LACNIC, or AFRINIC — lets the holder of an address block publish ROAs for it in a repository other networks can fetch and cryptographically verify. ARIN’s documentation on Route Origin Authorizations lists the same parts a ROA is composed of: an origin AS, a prefix and max length, and an optional ROA name. A router performing Route Origin Validation (ROV) checks each incoming BGP announcement’s origin AS and prefix against the published ROAs and can mark the announcement invalid if it doesn’t match, giving operators an automated, cryptographic way to catch the kind of false announcement that BGP hijacking depends on, instead of relying on the mutual trust BGP assumes by default. As RIPE NCC’s own BGP Origin Validation page puts it, “the current RPKI functionality solely offers origin validation” — ROAs only protect against incorrect origin AS claims; they don’t verify the full AS path an announcement travels, so a hijack — or a route leak, which keeps a genuine origin AS but propagates beyond its intended scope — that keeps the correct origin AS while forging or extending the path in between isn’t caught by ROV alone. A newer, complementary RPKI object, ASPA, closes that remaining gap by authorizing an AS’s actual upstream providers, letting a router validate the path itself rather than only its origin. Adoption is growing but still partial — a ROA only helps once enough networks along the path actually validate against it.
RPKI ROA (Route Origin Authorization) is part of AdminKit’s IP & network cluster; the full AdminKit glossary lists other related terms.
Frequently asked questions
What does an RPKI ROA state?
It states which AS number is authorized to originate routing announcements for a specific IP prefix, up to a stated maximum prefix length, as defined in RFC 6482.
Does a ROA protect against route leaks or AS-path hijacks?
No -- a ROA only validates the origin AS and prefix; it does not verify the full AS path, so a hijack or route leak that keeps the correct origin AS while altering the path in between is not caught by Route Origin Validation alone.
What closes the AS-path gap that ROAs leave open?
ASPA, a newer RPKI object that authorizes an AS's actual upstream providers, letting a router validate the path itself rather than only the origin.
Who can publish a ROA for an IP block?
The holder of the address block, through whichever regional internet registry issued it (ARIN, RIPE NCC, APNIC, LACNIC or AFRINIC), publishing it to a repository other networks can fetch and cryptographically verify.