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ASPA (Autonomous System Provider Authorization)

What is ASPA (Autonomous System Provider Authorization)?

ASPA (Autonomous System Provider Authorization), specified in IETF Internet-Drafts (not yet an RFC), is a signed RPKI object naming the authorized upstream providers of an AS, letting a router reject a BGP path with a forged hop even when its origin looks valid. AdminKit's Whois/RDAP tool checks an IP block's holder and AS number, the relationships ASPA validates.

By AdminKit team, Netbase JSC · Updated

An Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) is a signed object published in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) that states which autonomous systems are authorized to act as an AS’s upstream transit providers — the American Registry for Internet Numbers now issues these directly to its members. ASPA is not yet an RFC: the object is specified in the IETF SIDROPS Internet-Draft draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile and the path check in draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification, and NLnet Labs’ Krill documentation notes that ASPA objects and verification are still being discussed in the IETF. Where an RPKI ROA only lets a router validate the origin AS of a BGP announcement — the last hop — an ASPA lets a router validate the relationships between hops along the rest of the AS path, catching route leaks and certain BGP hijacks that forge a path while keeping a technically valid origin AS, exactly the gap Route Origin Validation leaves open. A router performing AS-Path validation checks each adjacent AS pair in an announced path against the providers each AS has authorized in its own ASPA, flagging a path as invalid if it claims a provider relationship that was never authorized. Relying-party software already supports this: NLnet Labs’ Routinator can process ASPA objects, include them in its published dataset and expose them to routers over RTR. Like ROA adoption before it, ASPA only protects traffic once enough networks along a path actually publish authorizations and validate against them, so its real-world effect depends on how broadly operators deploy it, not just on the specification existing.

AdminKit groups aSPA (Autonomous System Provider Authorization) under its IP & network cluster — browse the AdminKit glossary index for other related terms.

Frequently asked questions

What does an ASPA let a router validate that a ROA cannot?

A ROA only lets a router validate the origin AS of a BGP announcement -- the last hop -- while an ASPA lets a router validate the provider relationships between hops along the rest of the AS path.

What kind of attack does ASPA catch that Route Origin Validation misses?

Route leaks and certain BGP hijacks that forge a path while keeping a technically valid origin AS, since Route Origin Validation alone does not inspect the rest of the path.

Where is an ASPA published?

In the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI), as a signed object stating which autonomous systems are authorized to act as an AS's upstream transit providers.

Does publishing an ASPA alone secure a route?

No -- like ROA adoption before it, ASPA only protects traffic once enough networks along a path actually publish authorizations and validate against them, so its effect depends on operator deployment, not just the specification existing.