BIMI, MTA-STS and TLS-RPT explained
BIMI puts your verified logo next to your mail in a recipient's inbox, MTA-STS tells other mail servers to require encrypted delivery to yours instead of silently falling back to plaintext, and TLS-RPT reports when that encrypted delivery fails. AdminKit explains what each standard actually requires and how they fit together on top of SPF/DKIM/DMARC.
By AdminKit team, Netbase JSC · Updated
Key takeaways
- BIMI, MTA-STS and TLS-RPT do three different jobs: BIMI asks inboxes to show your logo, MTA-STS asks senders to require authenticated TLS when delivering to you, and TLS-RPT asks senders to report TLS problems back to you.
- MTA-STS (RFC 8461) and TLS-RPT (RFC 8460) are published RFCs. BIMI is an Internet-Draft, not an RFC; the BIMI Group, home of the AuthIndicators Working Group, publishes its implementation guidance, and each mailbox provider sets its own display rules.
- BIMI depends on DMARC at enforcement (
p=quarantineorp=reject). MTA-STS and TLS-RPT don’t depend on DMARC at all and are worth publishing even if you never use BIMI. - Publish TLS-RPT before or with MTA-STS: in
testingmode, TLS-RPT reports are how you see what senders found (RFC 8461 §5).
What does each of the three standards protect?
BIMI, MTA-STS, and TLS-RPT each solve a different problem on top of the SPF/DKIM/DMARC foundation, and each is published under its own DNS name rather than bolted onto an existing record:
- BIMI — shows a verified brand logo next to your mail in supporting inboxes.
- MTA-STS — tells other mail servers to require encrypted (TLS) delivery to yours, instead of silently allowing a downgrade to plaintext.
- TLS-RPT — reports back to you when that encrypted delivery fails somewhere, so a silent TLS problem doesn’t stay silent.
None of these three replace SPF, DKIM, or DMARC — they’re each optional layers. They also point in different directions. BIMI concerns mail you send: it only matters once receivers have authenticated your messages. MTA-STS and TLS-RPT concern mail you receive: they describe how other servers should connect to your MX hosts.
| BIMI | MTA-STS | TLS-RPT | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Protects | Brand display on authenticated mail you send | Transport of mail sent to you | Visibility into TLS failures on mail sent to you |
| Published at | TXT default._bimi.<domain> plus SVG logo over HTTPS | TXT _mta-sts.<domain> plus policy file at mta-sts.<domain> | TXT _smtp._tls.<domain> |
| Prerequisite | DMARC at p=quarantine or p=reject | HTTPS host with a valid certificate; MX certificates that match | A mailbox or HTTPS endpoint for reports |
| Status | IETF Internet-Draft | RFC 8461 | RFC 8460 |
| Reports | None in the base record | Through TLS-RPT | Daily JSON aggregate reports |
How does BIMI put a logo in the inbox?
BIMI lets a domain publish, in DNS, the location of a logo that supporting mailbox providers may show beside its authenticated mail. The BIMI Group’s FAQ describes it as a display signal: it does not change whether or how a message is delivered. The BIMI Group lists the specification on its supporting documents page as an IETF Internet-Draft, alongside separate drafts for BIMI reporting and SVG Tiny Portable/Secure, so it is not a published RFC.
default._bimi.example.com. TXT "v=BIMI1; l=https://example.com/logo.svg;"
The record lives at default._bimi.<domain>. l= points to the logo, which the BIMI Group says must be an SVG Tiny PS file served over HTTPS with the image/svg+xml content type. An optional a= tag points to a mark certificate.
The prerequisite that trips people up: BIMI requires DMARC to already be enforcing (p=quarantine or p=reject), not just present at p=none — a mailbox provider showing a brand logo next to a message is implicitly vouching that the message’s authenticity has actually been checked and acted on, not merely monitored. RFC 7489 §6.3 (now RFC 9989 §4.7) defines quarantine and reject as the two policies that ask receivers to act on failing mail. The BIMI Group’s implementation guide is stricter than “DMARC at enforcement”: it covers subdomains too (sp=quarantine or sp=reject), and says a pct below 100 is not accepted.
Beyond DMARC enforcement, some mailbox providers additionally require a mark certificate before they’ll display the logo at all. The BIMI Group describes two kinds: a Verified Mark Certificate (VMC), based on a registered trademark, and a Common Mark Certificate (CMC), issued by the same Mark Verifying Authorities with more flexibility about the mark. Its FAQ names Gmail and Apple as requiring a VMC, and Yahoo as able to show a logo from a self-asserted record without one, subject to bulk-mail volume and reputation. Which applies depends on the specific mailbox providers your recipients use, so check their current requirements before budgeting for a certificate.
A record at default._bimi on your organizational domain also covers its subdomains, according to the BIMI Group FAQ, and a subdomain can publish its own record to override it. Different mail streams can use different logos through other selectors, named in a BIMI-Selector message header, though the FAQ notes that selector support varies between platforms.
AdminKit’s BIMI check reads a domain’s live record and flags whether that DMARC-enforcement prerequisite actually holds, rather than just whether the record parses. It does not fetch the SVG or validate a certificate. The BIMI record generator builds the TXT value in your browser.
How does MTA-STS stop silent downgrades to plaintext?
It lets your domain tell senders, in advance, that your MX hosts support authenticated TLS, so a sender that honors the policy refuses to deliver rather than fall back to plaintext. Ordinary SMTP delivery between mail servers uses opportunistic TLS: a sending server offers to encrypt, but if the receiving server doesn’t support it, or an attacker on the network path interferes with the negotiation, delivery quietly falls back to plaintext rather than failing.
RFC 8461 (also on the IETF Datatracker) defines MTA-STS so a domain can publish a policy — fetched over HTTPS from a well-known URL, with a supporting DNS TXT record pointing to the policy’s existence — stating that mail to it must use TLS with a valid certificate. Its §10 names the two attacks this targets: stripping the 250 STARTTLS response so the session stays in plaintext, and impersonating your mail server by spoofing MX records or rerouting traffic.
_mta-sts.example.com. TXT "v=STSv1; id=20261022000000Z"
The actual policy document (which hosts, which mode: enforce, testing, or none) is served over HTTPS at https://mta-sts.example.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt, not in the DNS record itself — the DNS record only signals that a policy exists and its version, so senders know to check for an update.
Two limits are worth knowing. MTA-STS only helps once a sender has fetched and cached your policy, so RFC 8461 §10.2 notes that an attacker who can block DNS during a sender’s first lookup can hide it. And it relies on the web PKI rather than DNSSEC; DANE is the DNSSEC-based alternative, and the two can coexist. For the policy file format, MX matching, id changes and the testing-to-enforce rollout, follow how to publish and test MTA-STS. AdminKit’s MTA-STS check reads back a published policy.
What does a TLS-RPT report tell you?
It tells you, per sending organization and per day, how many TLS sessions to your MX hosts succeeded, how many failed, and why. RFC 8460 defines TLS-RPT, a reporting mechanism that’s useful with or without MTA-STS: it covers DANE policies too, and reports even when no policy was found.
_smtp._tls.example.com. TXT "v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tls-reports@example.com"
The rua tag takes one or more mailto: or https: destinations. Under RFC 8460, each report should cover a full UTC day and is a JSON file, usually gzip-compressed. Reports sent by email must carry a valid DKIM signature from the reporting domain, and senders must deliver them even if TLS to your server fails, which can mean the report itself arrives unencrypted.
An illustrative report excerpt, following the RFC 8460 §4.4 schema with documentation domains and addresses (the counts are made up for the example), looks like this:
{
"organization-name": "Sender Example Inc.",
"date-range": {
"start-datetime": "2026-11-09T00:00:00Z",
"end-datetime": "2026-11-09T23:59:59Z"
},
"contact-info": "tlsrpt@example.net",
"report-id": "2026-11-09-example-001",
"policies": [{
"policy": {
"policy-type": "sts",
"policy-string": ["version: STSv1", "mode: testing",
"mx: mail.example.com", "max_age: 86400"],
"policy-domain": "example.com"
},
"summary": {
"total-successful-session-count": 120,
"total-failure-session-count": 4
},
"failure-details": [{
"result-type": "certificate-host-mismatch",
"sending-mta-ip": "198.51.100.25",
"receiving-mx-hostname": "mail2.example.com",
"receiving-ip": "203.0.113.10",
"failed-session-count": 4
}]
}]
}
Read it as: this sender applied your testing policy, most sessions succeeded, and four sessions to mail2.example.com hit a certificate that didn’t match that hostname. In testing mode those messages were still delivered. Under enforce, they would have been held back. RFC 8460 §4.3 defines the other result types, including starttls-not-supported, certificate-expired, and the MTA-STS-specific sts-policy-fetch-error, sts-policy-invalid and sts-webpki-invalid.
Emailed reports are easy to filter. RFC 8460 §5.3 sends them as multipart/report messages with a report-type="tlsrpt" parameter, a TLS-Report-Domain header naming your domain, and a TLS-Report-Submitter header naming the sender. The attachment uses the media type application/tlsrpt+json, or application/tlsrpt+gzip when compressed.
Without TLS-RPT, an MTA-STS policy that’s misconfigured (wrong hostname, expired certificate) can silently block legitimate mail from any sender that respects the policy, with no notification reaching you at all. TLS-RPT is what closes that visibility gap. AdminKit’s TLS-RPT check reads a domain’s live record and flags whether it has an rua report destination, not just whether the record parses; the TLS-RPT generator builds the record.
What goes wrong with each, and where does it show up?
Each standard fails in a different place, so the place you look differs too. BIMI problems show up as a missing logo, never as a bounce. MTA-STS problems show up in TLS-RPT reports, and under enforce as delayed mail. TLS-RPT problems show up as silence.
| Standard | Common problem | Where you notice it | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| BIMI | DMARC at p=none, or pct below 100 | No logo at any provider | Move DMARC to quarantine or reject at 100% |
| BIMI | Logo not SVG Tiny PS, wrong content type, or blocked fetch | No logo, or a provider tool reports a fetch error | Serve a compliant SVG over HTTPS as image/svg+xml |
| BIMI | No mark certificate where a provider requires one | Logo at some providers only | Get a VMC or CMC if those providers matter to you |
| MTA-STS | mx line or MX certificate doesn’t match a real MX host | sts-* or certificate failures in TLS-RPT reports | See the MTA-STS failure table |
| TLS-RPT | No rua, or reports go to an unread mailbox | Nothing at all | Add an rua destination someone reads |
The BIMI rows come from the BIMI Group FAQ’s own list of reasons a logo doesn’t appear; it also mentions sender reputation thresholds and caching in mailbox interfaces, which you can’t fix by editing DNS.
In what order should you deploy them?
DMARC first for BIMI; MTA-STS and TLS-RPT can go in at any time, together.
- Get SPF, DKIM, and DMARC working first — see SPF, DKIM and DMARC explained if you haven’t yet, and check your current DMARC policy with DMARC check.
- Move DMARC to an enforcing policy (
p=quarantineorp=reject) before attempting BIMI — mailbox providers won’t show the logo otherwise. DMARC aggregate reports and rollout to reject covers that move. - Publish the BIMI record and logo once DMARC enforcement is stable, checking certificate requirements for your recipients’ mailbox providers if you need logo display everywhere.
- Publish MTA-STS and TLS-RPT independently of BIMI — they protect transport security rather than brand display, and are worth enabling even if you never pursue BIMI. Publish TLS-RPT first, then MTA-STS in
testingmode. Google’s Workspace guide to MTA-STS and TLS reporting gives the same order: start the policy in testing mode, use the daily reports to find and fix connection issues, then change it to enforce mode.
This guide is general information, not a security audit of your specific network — see our disclaimer for what AdminKit's guidance does and does not commit to.
Frequently asked questions
Do I need DMARC before I can use BIMI?
Yes, in practice. BIMI requires your mail to pass DMARC with an enforcement policy (quarantine or reject, not none) before mailbox providers will display your logo — BIMI is built on top of an already-enforcing DMARC deployment, not a standalone step.
Does every mailbox provider show BIMI logos the same way?
No. Some providers additionally require a Verified Mark Certificate (VMC), a paid, trademark-backed certificate, before they'll display the logo at all, while others display it from DNS records alone. Check the specific requirements of the mailbox providers your recipients actually use before investing in a VMC.
What does MTA-STS actually protect against that plain TLS doesn't?
Ordinary SMTP uses opportunistic TLS (STARTTLS) by default, meaning a connection silently falls back to unencrypted delivery if TLS negotiation fails or is actively blocked by an attacker — a downgrade attack a passive observer can trigger. MTA-STS lets a domain publish a policy saying delivery must use TLS, so a sending server that respects the policy refuses to deliver in plaintext rather than silently downgrading.
Is TLS-RPT required to use MTA-STS?
No, they're independent, but TLS-RPT is the only way to find out when MTA-STS enforcement (or TLS delivery generally) is failing somewhere, since a sending server that can't deliver under your MTA-STS policy fails silently from your side unless you've set up TLS-RPT to receive reports about it.
Who actually needs to set these up?
Any domain sending enough mail to care about inbox placement and brand recognition benefits from BIMI once DMARC enforcement is already in place. MTA-STS and TLS-RPT matter most for domains handling sensitive mail (finance, healthcare, legal) where a silent downgrade to plaintext delivery is a real risk worth closing, though they're low-cost enough to be worth enabling broadly.
Sources
- RFC 8461 — SMTP MTA Strict Transport Security (MTA-STS)
- RFC 8460 — SMTP TLS Reporting (TLS-RPT)
- BIMI Group — official BIMI specification and implementation guide
- IETF Datatracker — RFC 8461, SMTP MTA Strict Transport Security (canonical document record)
- BIMI Group — Implementation Guide
- BIMI Group — FAQs for Marketers and ESPs
- BIMI Group — Supporting Documents (IETF Internet-Drafts and Mark Certificate requirements)
- RFC 7489 — Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting and Conformance (DMARC), obsoleted by RFC 9989
- RFC 9989 — Domain-Based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance (DMARC)
- About MTA-STS and TLS reporting | Gmail | Google Workspace Help
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